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# A crucial moment of psychopathology: Heidegger's review of Jaspers' *Psychology of the conceptions of the world*

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From the current status of psychopathology abolition, in behalf of a reductionist and non-satisfactory empiricism that has overwhelmed psychiatry in a sterile paralysis, we question its origin, discovering in Jaspers the methodological problems that made him unable to assume obstacles and led us to the present situation. Matching Heidegger's review on *Psychology of the conceptions of the world*, we are tracing the criticism to that methodology, in an attempt to approach the model of a new empiricism for psychopathology that solves the current situation. We use this occasion to pursue the tracks followed by one of the confronted attitudes or another that we consider a psychopathology crossroad. We are investigating the consequences and alternatives derived for that new task in present time, once these methodological positions have been assumed.

**Key words:**  
Psychopathology. Jaspers. Heidegger. Methodology.

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## Un momento crucial de la psicopatología: la revisión de Heidegger de la *Psicología de las concepciones del mundo* de Jaspers

A partir de la constatación de la abolición de la psicopatología en la actualidad en favor de un empirismo reduccionista e insatisfactorio, que ha sumido a la psiquiatría en una parálisis estéril, nos interrogamos por el origen de tal situación y descubrimos en Jaspers las dificultades metodológicas que, en gran medida, nos han llevado a esta situación. Con ocasión de la revisión de Heidegger de su obra *Psicología de las concepciones del mundo* rastreamos la crítica a esa metodología en el intento de aproximarnos al bosquejo de un nuevo empirismo para la psicopatología que remedie la actual situación.

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Aprovechamos la ocasión para perseguir los caminos seguidos desde una u otra de las posturas enfrentadas en lo que consideramos una encrucijada de la psicopatología, y consideramos las consecuencias y las alternativas que se derivan para la nueva tarea en la actualidad una vez asumidas esas posiciones metodológicas.

**Palabras clave:**  
Psicopatología. Jaspers. Heidegger. Metodología.

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## INTRODUCTION

What we find in the unpublished review (at its time) of Heidegger on the *Psychology of the world's conceptions*<sup>1</sup> of Jaspers is far from having the appearance of a mere scholarly problem. Above all, we want to make it clear that, in regards to the psychiatry problem, an important question is presented that we are faced with nowadays, having the maximum relevance. It is the following: in the mentioned review, the questioning of the methodology that makes access to the material of our knowledge possible is manifested; it is discussed if the business of psychopathology has any type of real effectiveness; the viability of our action is placed in check-mate, on whether it is possible to speak for more time on mankind in terms of psychologism that, then as now, exercises an influence so ubiquitous as well as unfortunate for the exercise and practice of psychopathological knowledge. The fact that the need to leave this jam is being more clearly seen at present makes this outburst, this meeting/misunderstanding between the two major XX century German philosophers, an essential point to return to capture the essence of the problem that is of interest to the deepest feelings of psychiatry. Because, psychopathology and its validity as knowledge is found on the first level in this important question.

In a certain moment of the XX century history, a cross-over of perspectives between two important philosophers is carried out, in which if we consider its presentation, we can try to see and reconstruct the motives of the dissension and origin and escape route over which its consequences travel.

This moment is precisely the occasion of the review on the *Psychology of the world's conceptions* (1919) of Jaspers that Heidegger did not publish at that time (1921–1922) and that only appeared as a chapter in the work Wegmarcken (*Milestones*)<sup>2</sup>. This is precisely the time when Jaspers goes towards his own philosophy, progressively separating himself from his activity as psychiatrist and from the precipitation of this activity, the *General psychopathology*, with all the methodological consequences that this implied and that will become very significantly clear in Heidegger's review. Steps in this direction, which are undertaken with the pathographies, are even significantly related with the tracing of the road to follow in regards to self-possession of an existential philosophy that will separate him from the strictly scientific activity: psychiatry, but without renouncing it and even less giving it a unitary framework of understanding that includes both in regards to the way of understanding the reality.

On the side of Heidegger, we are faced with a philosopher who was going to become the most important in Germany in a few years, who still had not published anything relevant enough to give him the chair of Marburg, but who was elaborating one of the works that would have the most importance in the rest of the century: *Being and time*<sup>3</sup>. As anticipation of this work, we have the courses given both in Freiburg as well as Marburg until 1927, as well as the Natorp Report<sup>4</sup> and the lecture on time given in the theology society of Marburg<sup>5</sup>. All these works allow us to perfectly establish the setting in which the mentioned reception and criticism of Jaspers' work is developed and, at the same time, the road of his divergency is marked and will become irreconcilable and will have deplorable personal and political consequences in the life of both.

## JASPERS: THE QUESTION OF LIFE FROM PSYCHOPATHOLOGY TO PHILOSOPHY

What all of the work of Karl Jaspers seems to establish, both in its psychiatric as well as philosophic slope, since what is important to show here is the dependence of one in regards to the other, is the search for a thinking that is capable of offering us an access to life in its immediacy and existential precision. The bias of his investigation is going to be presided by an existential transformation of the transcendental philosophy of Kant<sup>6</sup> (p. 168), something that is going to give a time specific structure in both one activity as well as the other that allows us to observe a continuity between the two slopes of his intellectual activity. In turn, this onset point is going to be the limiting character of his response when he turns against the criticism of Heidegger, since in his radicalization of the phenomenology, he aimed to cut the Gordian knot of Kantism: the link between sensitive intuition and category, that maintained this philosophy within the score of the subsumption of the classical logic and that made it impossible to access the individual<sup>7</sup> (p. 137). Thus, the aim of both parties to access the indi-

vidual, the specific, is recognized, but we are going to see that the initial discrepancies between both very decisively affect the final results and, especially, the course followed over the XX century to establish a satisfactory psychopathology. First of all, we are going to immanently out-line the structure of *General psychopathology*<sup>8</sup> of 1913 to be able to understand how it is internally articulated and advise, then, that the evolution of Jaspers' ideas when he published his *Psychology* was implicit in his beginning point (*Anfang*), which in turn, will be the impediment to understand the *Phenomenology* of Husserl and, positively to understand, beyond the circumstantial considerations belonging to the epoch, the differences that prevented him from understanding the criticisms of Heidegger.

## Internal structure of his *General psychopathology*

The readers who still approach the *General psychopathology* presented it as a work of phenomenological psychopathology; this seems that it is going to become an unendable discussion<sup>9</sup>. A similar hefty volume is difficult to digest, not only due to the intricateness of its arguments and the diversity of the subjects approach-ed. In the beginning, what is found there is strange in regards to the presumed phenomenological character that is generally begun with. Jaspers uses the term phenomenological to refer to the real phenomena that occur in the real conscious, in an attempt to access the reality of the psychic life. In this way, he begins to describe psychic life with the aim that has both precision and generality, that is, that determines the specific from a universalizing type legality. This tension is that which is never satisfactorily solved by him. On the one hand, he found the isolated facts of the psychic life, that he calls elements, and on the other, its state of a whole, that he will call state of consciousness. Within these concepts, the problems of form and content are included<sup>10,11</sup>, content as object of the psychic life and form as modality according to how this object is experienced. The psychic element is all that which can be distinguished in the moment experienced<sup>12</sup> (p. 183). According to this, the phenomenology will deal with the comprehensive form and psychology of the contents<sup>8</sup> (p. 35). It classifies the psychic elements in: those that refer to the consciousness of the objects, to the consciousness of the self, to the affective, those belonging to instincts and will, those of the consciousness of time and space, of reality and of the own body. These psychic elements could be considered as contents of the consciousness. On the other hand, the state of consciousness refers to the totality of the psychic life in a given time. This would occur on four planes: being-here, consciousness in general, spirit and existence. The being-here must be studied in the category of causality and the existence in that of philosophy. The connection of sense, the comprehensive psychology is between both extremes<sup>12</sup> (p. 178). The individual psychic elements would be captured by a description that he calls phenomenologic. On applying an ideal sketch of motivation to these elements that is known intuitivity in the plane of the spiritual,

psychological understanding occurs. The ideal type is seen as a total evidence, as an absolute truth a priori. The understanding will not respond, thus, to the natural laws; it cannot be done with solid and invariable guidelines. This understanding should discover the true connection of motives that become real in an individual, that is, an interpretation. We mustn't forget that Jaspers tries to make a scientific psychopathology, always within a deterministic method. Thus, the comprehensive psychology serves to explain those phenomena whose scientific cause is unknown to us; through understanding, an underlying causal process can be supposed. To access the phenomena that do have a cerebral physiological cause, he uses the explanatory psychology. In this sense, Jaspers assumes that, with the advancement of science, the explanatory psychopathology will advance, taking away ground from the comprehensive psychopathology. If the psychiatry, as an autonomous knowledge, arose from the suppression of the subjectivity as a setting that is opposite to nature, thanks to the establishment of the positivist thinking in the XIX century, Jaspers, on reintroducing the Kantian thinking through the psychopathology, contributed to make the two following spheres reappear: reason and nature, as independent, although not for much time, since, as the spontaneous subjectivity was not resolved or reconciled with the finally noumenic sensitivity, made the psychiatry fall again, and, up to now, in the positivism that dominates us at present.

### *The Psychology of the world's conceptions*

The purpose of Jaspers when elaborating his *General psychopathology* was to provide greater clarity to the psychopathological practice and, at the same time, to generate a vision which was both globalizing and self-understandable of the activity itself carried out by the psychiatrists from the method used point of view. In this undertaking, as is known, Jaspers performed a work that reached an enormous influence but that also has been dissolving and toning down the possibilities begun in the first editions of the work, progressively deactivating the problems that had been opened and restricting the transforming reach of psychiatry. It would shed great light for that which is presently important to us to be capable of offering the internal impossibility of such deficit, being able to see the internal limits of its way of acting in order to be able to: *a)* understand the road of limitations and decomposition generated from these insufficiencies, and *b)* define these limitations in order to overcome them or, at least, to avoid them as far as possible. Some of this is that which Heidegger is seen to reproach in his criticism as we are going to try to have the opportunity to demonstrate.

If we consider the work of Jaspers as a whole and the courses that his work has come to give psychiatry, that is, against its purposes, in an empirism that has been sterile, producing the same problems as those which it aims to escape from, it can be very surprising that the evolution of

Jaspers' thinking in the progressive separation from psychiatry has led him to a philosophy of existence that may seem to question the suppositions on which the scientificity of psychopathology has been established, a scientificity that he does not renounce for this or in the last edition of the work after the 2nd World War. The *Psychology of the world's conceptions* meant the attempt to enter into the problems of his time, of escaping from a way of understanding the reality full of theory that obstaculized from the beginning accessibility to the immediate, the specific, a requirement that this convulsed time dominated all approach to the true. However, although in the *Psychology* and in *Philosophy*, he moves towards a clearly metaphysical position that questions existence as enigma only susceptible to existential explanation but in no case of knowledge, the methodological position maintained during his work is substantially invariable, based on the separation of the Kantian style between phenomenon and transcendent reality.

It is clear that the enigmaticness of life as problem is that which, forming part of the *Zeitgeist*, both Jaspers and Heidegger share with the so-called philosophies of life, but after this, noticeable differences of principle open up. To recognize them, it is necessary to notice the degree of acceptance of the Husserl' phenomenology, to what point it is assumed that the implications that are required from an orthodox interpretation of it can be shared more or less strictly. Above all, the contribution of Simmel should be manifested; in it, this author has decisive influence in regards to stressing the question of life itself and, what is more important for us, confronting it with the way that its appearance requires, and, at the same time, with the constant transgression that it its own conceptual display means<sup>13</sup> (p. 28). That proposed by *Jaspers' psychology of the world's conceptions* is precisely to hurl oneself towards life, be capable of granting objective and sense to life, undertake all the possibilities of the world conception from pseudopsychological presumptions, knowing that a purely objective knowledge was seen to be incapable of clarifying the subject thinking on itself<sup>14</sup> (p. 32). In this work, he goes through in an ideal-typical way the different moments, attitudes, religious, psychological and philosophical aptitudes which, as total complexes of sense, are ready to reach the total-ity of possibilities of the human. The effort is retrospectively assessed by Jaspers himself as failed but prolific. Dealing with this fecundity is what made the criticism of Heidegger productive, on showing us that, for the first time, new questions are approached with wide outlook, however unsatisfactory the result.

Jaspers will not accept the beginning point of phenomenology consisting in considering the subject-object split resolved by means of intentionality and world concept and this in spite of establishing the intentional character of the consciousness<sup>15</sup> (vol. 1, p. 6). For Jaspers, the objectivity gives oneself a consciousness, opposite and confronted to it, and thus, although a tendency to transcendency is recogni-

zed in life, this is not considered more than in the terms that his thought horizon offers it. The influence of Weber does not make it possible to go into the absolute with the characteristics of having more cognitive dimensions susceptible of being recognized in its display and, in this measure, take possession of it by mediation. The encompassing (*Umgreifende*) has some characteristics that are as real as un-understandable in epistemological terms. The fact that Jaspers proposes a psychology does not mean that he admits that this science is well defined, on the other hand, the universal consideration that he aims to give it would link it with philosophy. The reproach made by Rickert goes in this direction, in the sense that his scientific treatment (psychological) of the world's conceptions can only be supported by a philosophy of the values<sup>16</sup> (p. 87). With this, the Neokantisms, then hegemonic also in psychiatric thinking, reacted, accusing Jaspers of intrusive in the measure that, appealing to a philosophical knowledge, he showed deficiencies that presupposed intention, aspirations and knowledge that were not at his reach, but which, on the other hand, manifested the inextricable overlapping between psychiatry and the world of thought. As we are going to see, Heidegger will be more understanding in the estimation of the phenomena mentioned by Jaspers for the new way of thinking, although not less critical when judging the methodology used and the consequences that it has in regards to achieving this objective.

## HEIDEGGER AND LIFE: THE HERMENEUTIC OF FACTICITY

The problem that appeared within the gnoseological terminology and that presented in form of all types of psychologistic expressions is increasingly incapable of speaking of something so specific and immediate as life itself. In fact, he always speaks of life from theories, from mediated constructs that systematically ignore the horizon where living unrolls. Because the factic life makes itself known, beginning with and maintaining itself in immediate knowledge –not reflective– of itself in which this knowledge constantly acts<sup>17</sup> (p. 101). The task will then be to try to access factic life, but how? To do so, a destructive work is required that makes it possible to eliminate the interpretations thrown on top of life itself, making an attempt to clear up the setting to be able to see. However, soon, it is seen that the character interpreted, that hides life itself, is going to need something more than a mere adaptation or methodological improvement; it is going to require, above all, access to the way of being original manifested by life. For this, it will be necessary to renounce the usual categories in that thought is given to life and man, the direction of the questioning should be aimed at ways of being between the things, to the daily handling with questions of various types: usual things, intensions, commitments, responsibilities (*pragmata*), towards pretheoretic confrontation of our management that we have closest at hand, that is, ourselves, the things and the others as they are manifested. This is

what the hermeneutic transformation of the phenomenology is going to consist in, in a hermeneutic of facticity, in a fundamental ontology, that will aim to be a radicalization of the phenomenology of its teacher Husserl once he has separated from the road of the *Logical investigations*, above all of that which lead to the VI investigation<sup>18,19</sup> (p. 84)<sup>20</sup> (p. 140 and ss.). In the VI investigation, the route of a way of thinking that discovered in the categorial intuition the model to follow was indicated; in this way, explaining these objective structures of experience becomes the task of phenomenological ontology<sup>21</sup> (p. 371). Partially thanks to that involved in the categorial intuition, the investigations on Aristoteles and time will be gone into more later<sup>22-24</sup>, following the question on the being, on the concept of worldliness that will mean the extension of the idea of intentionality and the road towards hermeneutics, on showing that *belonging* by which the Kantian antinomies are overcome, both in their appearance as well as their deep structure, *comes from or* are originated from a setting that does not appear, in any way, of presence. Thinking this that makes it possible that something appears but that retracts constitutes the nucleus of Heidegger's thinking in a lasting way, although it may vary during the evolution of his thinking during his not-short production<sup>25</sup> (p. 269). This posture always was always considered by Jaspers to be possessed by a deep ambiguity<sup>26</sup> (p. 40).

This hermeneutics of the factic life comes from the middle term situation, that which is manifested in the daily life. Factic living is being in the world<sup>27</sup> (p. 109). With world, a decided desire to deactivate transcendent consciousness of his teacher Husserl is mentioned here<sup>28</sup> (p. 298). Before we are captured as subjects of all our acts, even before perceiving the experiences of our conscious course, something that is previous has already happened and creates all the rest: the being has already been. This being in the openness is that which is always behind us when we face anything or we find ourselves as consciousness. This being in the openness is what Heidegger calls *Da-sein*<sup>29</sup> (p. 50). From here, what is attempted is to think in another way. For this, Heidegger is going to go towards escaping from judgement as place of truth, in this aim he will initially follow Lask<sup>30</sup> (p. 61-104 and 519), however already from the Natorp Report<sup>4</sup> he will reinterpret Aristoteles with the aim of making it possible to consider the being of man as presence at hand (*Vorhandenheit*). In caution, he finds a road that considers the factic being without being guided by that which is always and necessary<sup>31</sup> (p. 97). In the praxis dealt with by *phronesis*, the object, its objective, its telos aimed at is life itself, but this «object» has a different ontology; the significativeness of the world, the plexus of references includes that in which man is installed, the worldliness, it finally results in a mere relationality which, in the background, culminates in the whereunto (*Worumwillen*). Mediating on the mystery of the *relationality* as previous and higher than his *relata* in which the dedication of Heidegger consists over all his extensive production and meditation<sup>32</sup> (p. 39).

## HEIDEGGER'S REVIEW: KEY MOMENT OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

At the beginning of the 1920's, philosophy was at an especially delicate moment, in which the need to think about life found methodological difficulties that were going to serve as escape points in regards to the dispersing of the different thought lines that were going to occupy the philosophical scenario of the XX century. In the relationship of Jaspers with Heidegger, this proximity will appear at once beneficial and confusing to authors. In fact, both agree on the need to revoke obsolete ways of thinking that make it difficult to experience life directly. In the crux found between the phenomenology content, for example, and its method, the possibility is offered of a wide margin for dissension; this occur up to such a point that Husserl himself did not notice until *Being and time* was published that Heidegger did not share the same sense of phenomenology as he did. If this occurs between the teacher and favorite disciple, it will not be difficult for us to realize the difference reach of understanding on it that can occur between two personalities that only share, although this may seem to be a lot, an intention to transform a state of things lived with uneasiness and lack of satisfaction.

In the review, we find the following criticisms of Heidegger, that are especially significant to manifest the methodical character of the dissension. «In Jaspers, the «method» is essentially bogged down in regards to way of technical control and ordering characterized as positions of agreement with his referential position....»<sup>2</sup> (p. 42). «All outstanding philosophical problem includes previous indications and references a posteriori that refer to connections of the principles. It is precisely a sign of lack of knowledge and under-evaluation of the real problem of Jaspers' method that he faces the problems of the psychology of the world's visions from this position characteristic of the individual sciences...»<sup>2</sup> (p. 46). Jaspers felt that this critical attitude was unfair and considered that it was not along the pathway that he was looking for<sup>33</sup> (p. 21 and 182), so that he accepted it reluctantly, if this can be said. It seems that both were looking for different things; this mutual lack of understanding indicates us the different direction, partially implicit in the way of acting in it. It is not difficult to observe the philosophical aims that are found, already on the surface of the text of *Psychology of the world's conceptions* (p.e., 1, p. 303), something that is observed very early and ratified by the personal course of Jaspers himself. In this set of positivity and transcendence, Achilles heel is going to be found, at which the darts of the criticism will be aimed from the very beginning. In this sense, the demand that a delimitation of the empiric ground by Heidegger is notorious. He makes empiricity depend on something deeper, ontological, original, etc., the phenomenology of facticity. With the criticism of Jaspers' work, he tries to access that which he wants and how he wants it, discussing the anticipation that served as a guide to Jaspers, but that he does not know its reach or implica-

tions. These are not accessible to him as it is not possible for him to articulate what is supposedly involved in the existential term, which, in reference to the noumenics of Kant, however, is mask-ed in the methodology itself that excludes it. The task and purpose of Heidegger will consist in showing how, in that which Jaspers proposes, but fails to duly articulate, there is a methodical deficit. Precisely, the response to this deficit is made in regards to the radicalization of the phenomenology contained in the VI Investigation. That is, this is where the problem of being separated from the judgement problem as a pretheoretical setting appears, which is no longer a simple concept or abstraction that is deductively achieved<sup>34</sup> (p. 402). Linked to this ontological problem, which, as is known, is that which interests Heidegger, the need for human existence (*Dasein*) through the concept of time is carried out, governed by the internal unavoidable aspect of thinking it from himself. This is precisely that which is initiated and sketched now with certain clarity in *On the concept of time*<sup>5</sup>.

## Criticism of Jaspers work

It recognizes an effort to find a psychology as totality, an intention to measure the limits of mental life in Jaspers' *Psychology of the world's conceptions*. For Heidegger, this specific tendency that attempts to gain the totality of psychology already has to be understood as philosophical<sup>2</sup> (p. 2). Heidegger aims, by means of a phenomenological criticism, to clarify the real objective of Jaspers' work, his original motives. To be able to reach their original motives supposes that a historical-spiritual destruction of the tradition oriented in a certain way is necessary; that is, an explanation of the motivating and original situations from which the fundamental philosophical experiences arise. This is done in order to then perform a radical construction without overlooking the motivation base itself, which is not original, since any act of vision lives within an orientation and preconception (*Vorgriff*)<sup>2</sup> (p. 5). Heidegger aims to call attention to the vision of psychology of Jaspers' world conceptions. He positively criticizes the posing of problems and of capturing that aimed at. In Jaspers' work, two tasks stand out: one previous, the constitution of psychology as a whole, and the real, of contributing explanations and possibilities as means for self-meditation. The problem posed comes from the attempt to limit the mental life, since when this is done in this way, it is being accepted that such life has some limits, that is, that there are limiting situations in the face of which certain reactions occur. Here it is conceived that in the posing of problem, there is already a previous anticipation of the mental that operates and that articulates in a certain way<sup>2</sup> (p. 8). Are unproven assumptions being introduced with this? He thus understands that Jaspers makes a clarification of life from a specific point of view, in which he considers valid fundamental approaches of that which is understood as life and as myself. These anticipations arise against the intentions of Jaspers, but it is not Heidegger's intention to undermine

his work in this way but to seek the motive, sense and reach of these directions to judge them according to their philosophical relevance and the originary aspect of his immanent intentions. In this, it is especially significant the way in which he is forced, in order to share a such objective, to make a transformation of the intentionality, going deeper into the ideal of Husserl and trying to dissolve the partiality in which this idea is taken by Jaspers. This leads him to accept postures that are methodologically inadmissible as they have consequences contrary to this objective: capture life as a whole. If the factic life has an intentional character, an appearance of the object as phenomenon is not possible, if tried in the sense of theoretical philosophy. It is necessary to take charge of the hermeneutic situation to include the amplitude of dimensions that are implied in the intentionality concept<sup>35</sup> (p. 146 and ss.). Thus, it is, definitively, about achieving a analytic description of intentionality in its *a priori*<sup>36</sup> (p. 67). This process in which the analytic element on the descriptive is going to be predetermined is going to require the explanation of intentionality in a new way, which, as we have mentioned further above, must radicalize the Husserlian perspective to avoid being shut way in a consciousness, in the context of the question for the being. This question will make it necessary to methodically pose the question for truth as presence in relationship to the time problem. This link means the need for ontology as hermeneutic of facticity makes time thematic and, from it, the historical character of human existence (*Dasein*) stands out, thus indicating an insurmountable belonging, by the conscious acts and demonstrating a precedence or anticipation of sense. This type of understanding is radically different from the understanding established by Jaspers, using, among others Weber<sup>37</sup>, underlines the need to irremissibly include the human action in a world that precedes him and that is referred to previously<sup>38</sup> (p. 56).

The observation method with which Jaspers aims to capture the totality of life is also object of the criticism of Heidegger. He understands that observation of how a combination of precisions and cases, denied their historic origin, is due to the fact that there is a problem of anticipation, that is, the historic is not assessed as the fundamental sense of existence. In establishing life as something observable in its whole, in this anticipation, Heidegger believes that the characteristics of Jaspers' method are found: conceptualization and systematization, that paralyze life, leading to the fact that it cannot be captured in its infinity, an infinity precisely proposed by the consciousness. Recognition of the problem of the totality includes a methodical consideration that makes operativization of such concept feasible: how this totality can be captured and how it can be worked with. This is how the need to manage the concept of anticipation, an operative concept that makes conceptual treatment of existential reality presumably discovered in its psychological effectiveness possible. This will be aporetic to Heidegger and will mobilize his thought in the sense indicated.

## The problem of anticipation

At all times, factic life behaves performing anticipations and what is important is to be able to recognize them. Considering that all anticipation problem is also one of method, it would be necessary to achieve that the sense of the method would be already given with the same anticipation. Fixation of the method sense should be maintained open to real and specific measurements, mediated by meanings that contribute a formal indication (*formal anzeigender Bedeutung*)<sup>2</sup> (p. 9). Jaspers defines the extreme situations as those in which antinomies are experienced. This occurs when man anticipates life as a totality and sees himself included in this totality as something basic surrounded by uninterrupted medium. In regards to these specific extreme situations explained by Jaspers, he considers that they are not adequately elaborated from the conceptual point of view and believes that this is due to the anticipation problem.

We see ourselves considering Jaspers' work within the so-called philosophies of life, in his attempt to access existence and, thus, within the positivistic tendency that uses expressive medians of the historical-spiritual tradition. Heidegger stresses the ordering of phenomena and his reflection on the problem of existence and psychology in Jaspers' work, however he believes that he fails in the attempt to explain the phenomenon of existence of this form, without considering the anticipation that is occurring. The motive of the anticipation comes from the fundamental experience that maintains the totality of life as idea, however this fundamental experience should be questioned on its sense, to be able to design the explanatory structure of psychology as a totality that is desired, and to prevent it from remaining as an object that is contemplated and described. The anticipation given here comes from, on the one hand, the union of the Kantian antinomies with the concept of infinite and, on the other, from the absolute concept of Kierkegaard. Both concepts arise, in turn, from the anticipation, and end up dissolving in the concept of life. The function of anticipation will be to have and understand the scope of the objective and specific mode, its fundamental esthetic position, and its origin that is an unquestionable accepting of oneself from the historical-spiritual situation<sup>2</sup> (p. 15). Heidegger asks if this anticipation can grasp the phenomena of existence, as Jaspers attempts, or whether when anticipation exists, existence cannot be investigated.

## Exposition of the problem of existence by means of a formal indication

Existence is proposed as a certain way of the «I am» that cannot be obtained from theoretical opinion but rather in the active observance of the «I am». The fundamental experience is that I have me<sup>2</sup> (p. 29). From the deterministic positions, what something is can always be explained by means of theoretical explanations. If it is aimed to regionally predetermine the self, the sense of I am is extinguish and becomes

a verifiable and classifiable object. Heidegger proposes a phenomenologically understandable objectivity, that is, non-theoretical, but one through access to the factic life. Then, the sense of existence is the sense of the being, something that cannot be accessed by objectivation, but rather by *being concerned*<sup>4</sup> for oneself that occurs before a possible objectifying obtaining of knowledge. The factic life is concerned with all that arising from the meeting in the daily and everyday treatment with the surrounding, shared and own world. Thus, the phenomenon of existence only opens to an active compliance of experience having a radical historical aspiration (...) that is essentially concerned for oneself<sup>2</sup> (p. 28).

In the «notes to psychology of Karl Jaspers' visions of the world», Heidegger uses the term *Dasein* for the first time to refer to the historical self, to indicate the specific situation in which that is lived in each case throwing the existence of the individual, to refer to the real experience of the human life. In his proposal, Heidegger bases the fundamental experience of considering oneself as a historical extension of the past of the «self» a self that is historically experienced. The own factic life existence is a phenomenon that is historically fulfilled and this is how oneself is experienced; it is not a historical phenomenon as object.

### The key moment of psychopathology

The crossroad in which both thinkers are found and are separated is key for the psychopathology because it decides in favor of Jaspers in a priority way, a choice that is finally shown to be unsatisfactory. On the one hand, Jaspers stops just before the possibility of understanding the factic life that he discovers and describes in all its amplitude. Mentioning totality as a central element of psycho(patho)logy is spoiled due to the methodical deficiency that prevent him from considering this concept as he is inexorably trapped in a framework of Kantian thinking in whose form and content (*Sosein and Dasein*) an adequate articulation is not found and positions antinomies are considered. The rejection of Heidegger towards Jaspers consists, finally, as we have tried to explain herein with the terminology that is still not purified and that will be achieved immediately afterward, in considering the inadequacy of his methodical action, in that he does not duly observe from his readings of Kant, Kiekegaard and Nietzsche that the concept of existence demands a phenomenological radicalization towards a hermeneutics of facticity, mentioned in the concepts of formal indication and anticipation. Existence is not the result of discovering or describing situations to cover the human that go beyond the order of formality when appealing to totalities but rather, it should be understood as a being open in different time modes towards a reality that exceeds us in and from which we are impelled to understand and to be understood.

On the other hand, the criticism of Heidegger will only find echo in those who are already anticipating, from the

clinical practice and theoretical insufficiency, the need of a different psychopathological thinking. It will be the moment in which, from a certain anthropological (Scheler, Häberlin, Plessner, etc.) and clinical view (Gebattel, Zutt, Straus, Binswanger, Storch, etc.), it will be possible to perceive the need to consider a different empiricity way, but, for this, it must be articulated according to the tradition of psychiatry. Around the beginning of the 1930's of the XX century, for those who, participating in a criticism and frontal rejection of the insufficiencies of the psychopathology and who did not have the conceptual pathways necessary to accept an untimely thinking such as that of Heidegger, deeply technical and demanding and, also, that needed to deconstruct the methodological suppositions of the dominant psychiatry, it was practically impossible to articulate with certain accuracy a satisfactory psychopathological alternative. However, in the methodical opposition between Jaspers and Heidegger, the urgent need to introduce a different bias to psychiatry can be observed. The fact that the result of the Heideggerian proposal has been historically unacceptable should not nor can take importance and meaning away from that which is implied there. It is key to the psychopathology of the future to be at the height of this discussion and accept or reject its arguments to be able to find some exit to the present situation of psychiatric thinking. However, an elaboration that is more or less adjusted to the level of this discussion still have consequences for psychopathology, as we are going to try to show in the following.

In short, we can say that the Jaspers/Heidegger confrontation places us in the face of an alternative that requires adopting empiricity modes and procedures that attack the shaping of psychopathology as a mere index of psychic contents, descriptively understandable in reference to a supposed cerebral activity that is always deferred, or on the contrary, consider psychopathology as an activity that gives sense to behaviors from the conditions of their possibilities, heeding the way in which they occur and how much they occur in a context of sense that precede them and to which they belong.

### CONSEQUENCES FOR PSYCHOPATHOLOGY

It is necessary to place the problem that has just been presented again in the foreground in the final attempt to make it a presentation that manifests simultaneously the appropriateness and adequacy regarding the appropriateness of the interrogation on the psychopathology here and now, in the times that are passing, penetrated with the idea of progress and of a certain way of scientificity. What we are being told in this confrontation is that maintaining a way of understanding mental or psychic life is not an easy question, and far from being something that does not require previous work. In the beginning of the 1920's of the last century, the question of life was in full peak and was important not only to philosophy but also to the combina-

tion of knowledge and its forms impregnated the different specific sciences. One part of this confrontation serves to manifest this state of things.

From this meeting, problems are seen that are going to grip psychopathology beginning in the 1930's, leading it, against its aspirations, along a road that ends in its dissolution as own and specific knowledge. The difficulties that the psychopathology of Heidelberg has and the alternatives offered later by the representatives of the so-called anthropological-phenomenological psychiatry stand out in a special way. The school of Heidelberg<sup>39,40</sup> continues with Schneider along a route of growing formalizing, giving priority to a concept of Kraepelinian type disease with all its implications, in which the psychiatric sign is read without ambiguity and univocally referred to brain functions increasingly broken down, but also increasingly more incoherent with the whole that it is aimed to refer to and understand. Incapable of overcoming the beginning position that limits Jaspers thinking in an aporetic situation, the dynamism that is installed in Heidelberg is going to progressively demand the overcoming of the onset limitations. Thus, the successive promotions that occur are restricted by these limitations and surpassing them in such a way that they relieve the tension in which they are installed from the moment in which they become attached to this school. Baeyer, Kisker, Tellenbach and Häfner, and up to a certain point Blankenburg, continue along this road, exploding from inside the inherited and apparently solid and coherent building to which Gruhle, Beringer, Bürger-Prinz, Mayer-Gross, Weitbrecht, Janzarik or Huber continue to be frankly joined to.

On the other hand, the reading and acceptance of the work of Heidegger provides us with an extensive review of the traditional psychopathological concepts that are fulfilled by Binswanger as well as Kunz, Storch, Boss, and in another sense by von Gebattel or Zutt<sup>41,42</sup>. Only Binswanger will formulate an internally more solid conception, although to do so, he has to use a certain moment of the work in course of the publication at that time of Husserl, a Husserl that seems willing to face the criticism of idealism that he had received from different fronts<sup>43</sup> and, consequently, he can offer a more complex and complete articulation of that explained in *Ideas*<sup>44</sup>. This phenomenological-anthropological reading continues to fight until nowadays, completely outside of standardized psychiatry, in which the tension opened by Jaspers has been eliminated in favor of a limiting and impoverishing empirism which is where we live inexorably installed in our psychiatric practice<sup>45-47</sup>.

It is possible, however, to draw some corollaries from his confrontation besides helping to be able to understand the course of extinction followed up to the present. In the reaction of Heidegger, the need stands out to deal with, to grasp life (psychic) which is that which, in short, psychiatry is about, the tendency to totality, a reexpression that impels the establishment of a new empiricity, exactly that which should undo the Gordian knot that in an unthought way

has inherited from its past included in a history, the history where only psychiatry as a Western science and knowledge makes sense. To do so, the facts must occur from and in a consciousness. Although the solution is not found in psychiatry or in the most outstanding responses that have been offered and are offered, it is no less certain that it installs us in a course that places us in situation of thinking from there in another way. And it is there, in the need to confine ourselves to the unfolding of the intentionality as behavior (*Verhaltung*), as pre-understanding anticipation of a relationality that is established for us in an exemplary way, constitutes the relationship between psychiatrist and patient. This relationality already requires that we get rid of the determining principle that is seen in the inherence of Jaspers and that must be necessarily overcome. The validity of psychopathology as action, as act, ergon more than as a mere list of contents, eliminates this position and requires a hermeneutic logic<sup>49</sup> different from that which must always be developed in a transitory and discontinuous way. However this is not without the consequent reaffirmation and resolution of having been able to grasp this donation of sense in a new way: the way of accepting and opening up to reality that is carried out by the patient (and the psychiatrist, in another way) in the measure that he manifests a life that experiences the world<sup>49</sup>.

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