

Juan J. López-Ibor¹
María I. López-Ibor¹

Romanticism and Schizophrenia. Second part: The Intimacy hypothesis

¹Departamento de Psiquiatría
Facultad de Medicina
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Instituto de Investigación Sanitaria del Hospital Clínico San Carlos (IdISSC)
Fundación Juan José López-Ibor
Madrid. Spain

In the first part of this article we have analyzed the evidence supporting the recency hypothesis of schizophrenia and also what we can call the intimate nature of the disease. In this part we highlight the role of certain cultural aspects that have been ignored up to now, aspects that are associated with deep changes in the *Weltanschauung* and systems of beliefs on human nature brought up by the late Modernism, specifically by Romanticism. The description of the main characteristics of Romanticism, starting with the "discovery of intimacy", leads to the conclusion that the characteristic alteration of subjectivity and ipseity of the disease appears to be a vulnerability factor when somebody has to face the new challenges raise Romanticism.

The consideration of Hölderlin's literary achievements and the deep psychological drama prevailing in them, makes explicit how the late modern human being finds in Romanticism the source of creativity and personal development but also the threat of his or her own destruction. Finally we link our hypothesis with recent genetic perspectives that consider sets of diseases associated to the same gene or genes (*diseasome*). In any case the process of associating the traits of Late Modernism and Romanticism with the core features of schizophrenia allows to consider the amalgamation of insanity with society, both at a general level and in what concerns individual patients, paving the way for novel therapeutic strategies.

Keywords: Schizophrenia, Culture and illness, Modernism, Romanticism, Intimacy hypothesis of schizophrenia, History of psychiatry, Hölderlin, Ipseity, Creativity and illness

Actas Esp Psiquiatr 2014;42(5):201-27

Romanticismo y Esquizofrenia. Segunda Parte: La hipótesis de la Intimidad

En la primera parte de este artículo hemos analizado la evidencia en que se basa la hipótesis de la recencia de la esquizofrenia y también lo que podemos llamar la naturaleza íntima de la enfermedad. En esta parte subrayamos el papel de ciertos aspectos culturales que han sido ignorados hasta ahora, aspectos que se asocian con los profundos cambios en la *Weltanschauung* y en los sistemas de creencias sobre la naturaleza humana que trajo consigo la modernidad tardía y concretamente el romanticismo. La descripción de las características principales del romanticismo, empezando por "el descubrimiento de la intimidad", nos lleva a la conclusión de que la alteración de la ipseidad y de la subjetividad característica de la enfermedad parece ser un factor de vulnerabilidad cuando la persona ha de afrontar los nuevos retos que plantea el romanticismo. La consideración de los logros literarios de Hölderlin y del drama psicológico profundo presente en su obra, pone de manifiesto como, en el contexto del final de la edad moderna tardía, el ser humano encuentra en el romanticismo no sólo una fuente de creatividad y desarrollo personal, sino también la amenaza de su propia destrucción. Por último, ponemos nuestra hipótesis en relación con hipótesis genéticas recientes que identifican conjuntos de enfermedades asociadas con el mismo gen o genes (*diseasoma*). En todo caso, el proceso de asociación de los rasgos del romanticismo con las principales características de la esquizofrenia nos permite considerar la posibilidad de una especie de amalgama entre locura y civilización, tanto a nivel general como en los pacientes individuales, que allana el camino para nuevos enfoques terapéuticos.

Palabras clave: Esquizofrenia, Cultura y enfermedad, Modernidad, Romanticismo, Hipótesis de la intimidad de la esquizofrenia, Historia de la psiquiatría, Hölderlin, Ipseidad, Creatividad y enfermedad

Correspondence:
c/ Doctor Juan José López Ibor num.2
28035 Madrid, Spain
E-mail: jli@lopez-ibor.com / mariaines@lopezibor.com

INTRODUCTION: CULTURE AND IDENTITY

In the first part of this article¹ we have analyzed the evidence supporting the recency hypothesis of schizophrenia and also what we can call the intimate nature of the disease. In this part we highlight the role of certain cultural aspects that have been ignored up to now, aspects that are associated with deep changes in the *Weltanschauung* and systems of beliefs on human nature brought up by the late Modernism and specifically by Romanticism.

One of the main conclusions of the present paper is that schizophrenia is, among other things, a cultural phenomenon. The link between culture and schizophrenia is accomplished through the process of identity formation. "Identity" is the relationally constituted self and is always the manifestation of a particular cultural environment if we consider culture as the symbolic transmission of human ways of life².

The symbolic reality that emerges when sign is transformed into symbol is a process that occurs simultaneously at the collective and individual level. At a collective level this phenomenon is called culture; at the individual level it is called mind. In other words, the symbolic process of individual mind is dependent upon the symbolic process at the collective level. Therefore, the mind is "individualized culture". The mind constantly borrows symbols from culture, but culture can only be processed in the mind as symbols can only have significance and be symbols in the mind.

For most of human history, in most societies, identity is established at birth. In other words, the socio-cultural space relevant for the life of every individual is clearly characterized and for long periods of time it was easy to implement since it was well understood. People knew since ancient times their proper place in society.

Later on, we will associate the eclosion of Modernism with the emerging individualism represented by the poetry of Petrarch (1304–1374). From a sociological perspective Lia Greenfeld^{3,4} considers the War of Roses (1450–1474) in England as the turning point for the emergence of Modernism. The war generated heavy casualties among the nobility, which came on top of the changes in feudal English society caused by the after-effects of the Black Death - peaking in Europe in the years 1348-50 -. All this lead to a weakening of the feudal power of the nobles, to a corresponding strengthening of the merchant classes, and to the growth of a strong, centralised monarchy under the Tudors. These events indicate the end of the medieval period and the advent of the Renaissance. In political terms, these changes could be described as bringing about "the emergence of modern consciousness".

Modern consciousness is fundamentally secular and humanistic and it is based on the principles of people's

sovereignty and egalitarianism. No longer confined to a particular social status within a closed structure ordained by the Divine Providence, human beings became their own rulers, the makers of their own destiny. This rising in dignity for every single individual meant that life here and now took on much greater importance and that eternity was no longer the realm of the meaningfulness. This is the origin of the secularism of modern society.

For the first time in history, identity-formation became the responsibility of each individual. As the opportunity to rise above the position of one's birth coexists with possibility of failing, this responsibility became a burden. Furthermore, the presence of circumstantial, or worse, socially imposed, obstacles to one's advancement clashes with the belief in one's equality and right to self-governance. This inability of culture to provide the individuals with consistent guidance is called anomie⁵ and is the most dangerous problem of modernity⁴.

The individual symbolic process, the mind, is manifested through three mental structures²:

1. **Identity** (the relationally-constituted self). Identity refers to symbolic self-definition. It is the image of one's position in the socio-cultural realm. Identity holds and provides information regarding one's social status and one's standing *vis-à-vis* non-human symbolic presences (the ancestors, the nation,...), one's relevant others and one's significant symbolic environment. Identity is experienced, in part, as "our sense of connectedness to others". Questions about identity are usually only made explicit if the identity proves to be problematic. In other words, the question, "who am I?" occurs most likely only to someone who would have difficulty answering it.
2. **Will** (acting self). The will is the aptitude of the mind to make decisions. While identity is the product a particular cultural environment at a specific time in history, the will is a product of culture in general, it is a function of symbols. The will is the function of the *autonomy of human consciousness*, of the independence from the natural environment. Thus, it is the expression of *subjectivity*. The will takes its direction from identity, choosing the appropriate "operative logic" to follow given the context. Usually, this is an unconscious process but sometimes this process becomes explicit. Because the will operates on the basis of identity, problems with identity may translate into impairment of the will, and the person may become indecisive and unmotivated, or, the decision making could become completely haphazard and unrestrained.
3. **Thinking self** (the "*I of self-consciousness*"). The thinking self is consciousness turned upon itself, which

is what Descartes had in mind when stating "*I think, therefore I am.*" In other words, the existence of the thinking self cannot be doubted as it is the only certain knowledge we have. While identity and will remain hypotheses, the thinking self, is explicitly symbolic, meaning that it actually operates with formal symbols, above all, language. Its most important function is to be the continuation of the cultural process on the individual level.

The lack of a clear direction of modern culture makes the once relatively simple process of identity formation much more complicated. A well-formed identity functions as a map of the relevant sociocultural terrain, making possible the subjective ranking of the choices present at any moment, giving the acting self (the will) a basis for decision-making. It follows then, that problems with identity formation lead to problems with the will. Distortion of identity and impairment of the will affect the functioning of the thinking self (the "I of self-consciousness") that operates with formal symbols, specifically with language.

Greenfeld^{2,4}, who has developed many of the ideas we are exposing, argues in favour of a cultural origin of madness in general which is to be considered as a manifestation of modernity, an effect of our cultural environment. But her thesis has two weaknesses. First, it is not possible to put in the same basket all forms of severe mental disorders, such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major depression, as the cultural connection, what lies behind the recency hypothesis is characteristic of the first. The fact is that traces of bipolar and major depression in pre-Modern times are evident. And second, the fact that a form of madness appears in a specific cultural environment, is not sufficient to blame this background for its origin, be it only because the number of those affected is a small percentage of the total population.

Greenfeld² argues that psychotic disease is fundamentally a malfunction of the "acting self," experienced as a loss of the familiar self and as a loss of control over one's physical and mental activity, a response to the cultural demands of selfhood.

The language and thought of people diagnosed with schizophrenia is not simply devoid of content or disorganized. Rather, it is unconstrained by proper logic, and by the various contextual logics at work in a particular culture and time. If the individualized part of the mind - the part that internalizes the multitude of cultural conventions - is not functioning normally, a disturbed consciousness of both the external world and the self may result. The process of "restoring again the world together", which for the most part, usually is not a self-conscious process, becomes an explicit effort.

While the sufferer may lack the individualized part of the mind, the general resources of culture, above all

language, are often incredibly active, and lacking the direction from the will that a clearly experienced identity would provide, the symbolic resources of the mind seem to run free. While certainly there are modern writers and artists who have suffered from mental illness, Greenfeld² identifies the primary difference between some forms of art and the language of people with schizophrenia, by relating back to the mental structure process of will. While the artist or performer decides him/herself to "let go", as it were, and be carried away by the various sonic and semantic connections in language which are usually not central to everyday speech, in schizophrenia this "*undirected rush of speech*" cannot be switched on and off - it seems to speak itself and is often experienced as "*an oppressive external force*". The connections between thoughts and statements are led by the associations inherent in language (which are of course almost infinite and can go in any number of directions) rather than by the intention of the subject².

MODERNITY

"Modern Age" is a vague term which encompasses different periods according to the discipline that makes use of it (history, literature, music, pictorial arts, and so on). For the purpose of the present paper it begins with the War of Roses, as we have already mentioned, and the Italian Renaissance and it melts with Post-modern Era. Postmodernism is a word coined in 1949, to describe rather a movement in art than a period of history, but nowadays is applied to significant changes occurring in the late 1960s in economy, society, culture, and philosophy. Nevertheless, the earliest manifestations of post-Modernism are the avant-garde artistic movements arisen after the First World War.

Very often Modern Age is divided in two: early and late, being the period of the French and American Revolutions the frontier between them.

Early Modern Age

The notion about the Creation, the world and the human nature prevailing in the Middle Age was the culmination of Greek and Hebraic traditions embedded in Christianity. The pre-Socratic philosophers developed a world view based on the harmony between nature, human kind and human knowledge. For instance, the four elements corresponded to the four humors and those to the four temperaments. The design went on to include gods, planets, colors, metals and so on. This harmony was possible thanks to the rational principle that was believed to develop and govern the universe, the *Logos*. *Logos* was translated into Latin as *ratio* 'reason' but for the Greeks it also meant speech. A third meaning in modern English is the divine

wisdom manifested in the creation, government, and redemption of the world and often identified with the second person of the Trinity.

In the Ancient Testament, Yahweh progressively establishes a relationship with human kind which gives meaning to life and nature, referred in the New Testament as *Verbum*. The message is that God, the creation, human nature and human thinking share the same characteristics, and therefore, they are accessible to human understanding.

The Hebraic and the Greek traditions merge by the efforts of neo-Platonic philosophers such as Plotinus⁶ and *Logos* and *Verbum* became synonymous as in the first verse of Johannes Gospel *En arkhêi ên ho logos*, which has been translated in Latin and Roman languages as *In principio erat Verbum* and in English as *In the beginning was the Word*.

The early Modern Age destroys the up to then solid classical medieval *Weltanschauung* paving the way for the advent of humanism. Although the term *humanism* has been used with different meanings mainly by those circles which call themselves humanistic, we stick here to the most accepted definition which is rooted in the Italian Renaissance⁷. Essentially, humanism is a conception of the world that is profoundly different and opposed to the preceding medieval one, emphasizing the role and value of human beings, both individually and collectively, as central characters in nature and in history invested with a leading role.

Once the theocentric perspective prevailing up to then had been surpassed, human beings adopted a different attitude towards knowledge. The authority of religious texts and authorities in the Middle Age is replaced by the cult of ancient classical artistic and philosophical productions and especially by individual principles and through the search for evidence, in other words, rationalism and empiricism. Modern science and technology are among the most successful consequences of Renaissance humanism.

For the purpose of the present paper, the main characteristics of Early Modern Age and humanism are:

1. **Individualism.** Individualism highlights the supremacy of the individual⁸ who confronts external interferences with his own interests by creating or participating in culture, religion, society or institutions. The individual is proclaimed "*of primary importance in the struggle for liberation*"⁸ and consequently, "*the right of the individual to freedom and self-realization*" is declared⁹.

Individualism can be illustrated in the following verses of Petrarch (Canzonero 81):

I'm so wearied by the ancient burden, / of these faults of mine, and my sinful ways, / that I've a deep fear of erring on the road, /and falling into my enemy's hands.

Here the first person personal pronoun appears five times in four verses. Nobody had dared to do such a thing before Petrarch.

2. **Secularization and rationalization.** One of the consequences of the birth of individualism was a deep transformation of society abandoning the identification with religious values towards the pursuit of new nonreligious values. Secularization paves the way to a process of modernization and of progress based on rationalization. This period of time is also called the Classic Age or the Age of Reason - a period when irrationality was literally segregated from the world as Foucault described¹⁰ -. It is worth to notice that Foucault's original title, *Déraison et folie: Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique*, has been translated as *Madness and Civilization, A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, opposing *déraison* ('lack of reason', 'insanity') and *civilization*, and equating Classical Age and Age of Reason.
3. **The rip up of Modernity.** The harmony, serenity and reassurance of the medieval world are torn apart with the advent of Modernity. In this context we will now consider here four main themes. First, there is a rebirth of almost surpassed dualism. In the most forceful way Descartes teaches that there are two natures in us¹¹: 1) the *res cogitans* which is the rational substance, the spiritual substance, the soul, whose essential attribute is thought and 2) the *res extensa* which is the bodily substance. Its essential attribute is the extension. This split leads to rejection of one of its constituents¹², in the case of Descartes the body:

*it is certain that I, my soul, by virtue of which I am what I am, is entirely and truly distinct from my body, and may exist without it*¹³.

A second rupture is the segregation of reason and insanity. Foucault¹⁰ described how in the Classical Period (roughly the Early Modern Age) reason kept madness in its widest sense segregated from open society leading to the establishment of asylums and similar institutions.

A third tear concerns secularization and its expression is the separation of philosophy and theology, and the antagonism between science and faith. Later on, already in late modern times, separation of Church and State became one of the achievements of democracy.

A fourth split is between science and technology that threatens to give predominance to the latter which may become the ruler, as denounced by Heidegger¹⁴.

4. **The advent of doubt.** Deprived of the secure anchor of *Logos* and *Verbum* and having to confront a secularized

and disintegrating world, the modern human being becomes confused, doubtful, dominated by an existential doubt as in the case of Hamlet, or a methodological one in the case of Descartes¹¹. The role of reason becomes that of delving systematically into the contradictions of a disintegrating experience of nature in order to solve the conflict in an empirical fashion. However, the main questions raised by the tear apart referred to above have no scientific answer and so human beings are forced to learn to tolerate and coexist with ambiguity, but this is a topic of Late and not for Early Modern Age, explicitly made in Merleau-Ponty¹⁵.

We might assume that the characteristics of Early Modernity are a risk factor for people prone to develop schizophrenia. Breaking the barriers as individualism does, the suppression of the safe anchors of religion and the confrontation with ambiguity are difficult task for people having disturbances of their selfhood. But, cases of schizophrenia are not to be found until the end of the eighteenth century. We have to assume that either they went unnoticed or some protective factor, which disappeared latter on, was present. A characteristic of early Modern Age which might have helped to keep at bay schizophrenia is rationalism.

Late Modernism and Romanticism

The transition from early to late Modernism was huge leap. The historic milestones are the first Industrial Revolution (1760-1820/1840), the American War of Independence (1775-83), the French Revolution (1789-1799), the *Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen* (1789) and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1793).

The English Industrial Revolution led to the rise of a bourgeois class and set the foundations of liberalism; the French Revolution (1789), proclaimed the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity (brotherhood); the American Revolution and the Declaration of Independence (1776), put human rights the centre of political activity and established a democratic government system with the people as the only source of power. As a consequence, freedom replaces tyranny, absolute power is restricted and democracy comes to be considered as the ideal form of government.

The Industrial Revolution was not universally welcome and led to a rise of an intellectual and artistic hostility against the emerging power of technology. The reaction involved the Enlightenment, the movement whose main purpose was to reach a better and more rational world. The end result of this attitude was a deep critic against some of the foundations of

Early Modernism - specifically rationalism and technology -, bringing forward concerns such as that scientific progress might be two-edged, and could escape the hands of human beings as in the myth of Prometheus. The whole reaction became what is known as the Romantic Movement.

Romanticism

The origins of the movement that subverted the idea that there are moral and political truths that all rational human beings can discover and verify for themselves has least three roots: 1) the doctrine of freedom in the philosophy of Kant¹⁶; 2) the individualism and anti-universalism proclaimed by Herder¹⁷; 3) the interpretation of life in terms of the aesthetic model of writers of the early Romantic movement in Germany¹⁸ (*Sturm und Drang*, 1760-1780).

Romanticism has been defined as¹⁹:

a literary, artistic, and philosophical movement (...) characterized chiefly by a reaction against neoclassicism and an emphasis on the imagination and emotions, and marked especially (...) by sensibility and the use of autobiographical material (...).

In a more concrete way, Drabble²⁰ defined Romanticism as "an extreme assertion of the self and the value of personal experience. The stylistic keynote is intensity and its watchword is imagination". The romantic vision of the world is the one of someone who is at the same time victim and fundament of his own cosmos²¹.

Romanticism was an artistic, political, social and ideological revolution which deeply transformed individuals and society. Romanticism brought up important principles that are still relevant today: freedom, individualism, democracy, nationalism, etc. Romanticism is associated with socially progressive causes and with the predominance of feelings over rationality¹⁸.

Romanticism is one aspect of a wider and significant social and historical change. The change was both sudden and profound. Suddenly neoclassical works of art which were frigid, codified and impersonal were replaced by a volcanic anarchic and agitated narcissism. It has been said that between 1770 and 1800 "Europe went to sleep absolutist and neoclassical and raised democratic and romantic".

In words of Almeida Garrett, the great Portuguese romantic writer

*"This is a democratic century, all that is done will be done by the people and the people ... or will not be done (...). Give (the people) the truth of the past in the historical novel and drama - in the drama and the novel now give them the mirror in which to look at it yourself and your time (...). Romanticism is a transition period, a discourse between discourses, a time of destruction and construction."*²²

Turner²³, in his comments on Hare's recency hypothesis, underlines, rightly so, the "extraordinary changes in English society between 1780 and 1820 and the shift from agrarian to urban life style". And adds: "Urbanization and migration are two elements involved in the outbreak of schizophrenia. Furthermore, urbanization is associated with household crowding and risk of transmissible diseases".

Romanticism is often defined based on a few particular features such as: individualism, medieval themes, Christian motifs, impossible loves, exoticism, local flavour, supernatural influences, tombs and nightly shadows. Favourite themes of Romanticism turn around the antagonism of outer and inner world, the One and the Whole, life and death, reason and insanity (for the first time asylums opened their doors to public), faith and science (leading to the French *Encyclopédie*).

In a more precise way, according to Sebold²¹ the romantic worldview is determined by the individual state of mind, which in turn is manifested through seven symptoms and five metaphors. The seven symptoms of the romantic worldview are: 1) feelings transcend thoughts; 2) the soul of the poet and the soul of nature are amalgamated with each other; 3) the pseudo-divinity of the romantic human being; 4) the feeling of loneliness; 5) an attitude of superiority; 6) the universal nuisance and 7) the enjoyment in pain. For our purpose we have grouped these features in a way that facilitates the analysis of the psychopathology of schizophrenia described in part one¹.

1. Subjectivism, selfhood and ipseity

Selfhood is a core feature of Romanticism. The main consequence of individualism is subjectivism, which bestows primacy to the subjective experience of human being. The romantic soul is not externally invested on the individual, on the contrary, it emerges when becoming aware of the own feelings, something that makes the individual unique and universal. As a consequence, the universe can only be conceived from the knowledge of oneself, for man is the image of the macrocosm. The self is the only existing reality, because "there are no more objects than those which have a conscience. You yourself are your own object."²⁴ By considering themselves as a real agent of the phenomena of universal nature, often almost as determinant of these phenomena, the romantic man and woman end by imagining himself or herself as new gods. The Sevillian poet Gabriel Garcia and Tassara (1817-1875) writes:

"My God am I, my company myself" and also: "I am my own God, alone in my heaven".²⁵

Subjectivism in its extreme form becomes solipsism, in which the nature and existence of every object depends

solely on someone's subjective awareness of them. From the solipsistic standpoint, the existence of one's own mind is the only certainty. In other words, reality is what we perceive to be real, and that there is no underlying true reality that exists independently of perception.

In this context, originality becomes a main goal to attain. The artist has to be a genius, able to produce his own original work through this process of "creation from nothingness"²⁶. In the Middle Ages authority was prized more highly than originality, and authority either you have it or you don't. But the romantic - and post romantic - creative person is burdened with the duty of an impossible originality and troubled by the subsequent guilt because absolute originality is unachievable. Gertrudis Gómez de Avellaneda distressed writes:

"How often I envied the fate of those women who do not feel nor think (...)" "Overwhelmed by the instinct of my superiority, I suspected then that what I have known very well: that I was not born to be happy".²⁷

2. The protagonism of feelings

The Romantics gave great importance to the untrammelled expression of feelings: "the artist's feeling is his law" (Caspar David Friedrich)²⁸; "si c'est la raison qui fait l'homme, c'est le sentiment qui le conduit" (Schiller, paraphrasing Rousseau²⁹). Feelings become an essential constituent of human nature, even over and above reason as we have mentioned. In words of Pascal:

M. de Roannez said:

"Reasons come to me afterwards, but at first a thing pleases or shocks me without my knowing the reason, and yet it shocks me for that reason which I only discover afterwards." But I believe, not that it shocked him for the reasons which were found afterwards, but that these reasons were only found because something shocked him.

"The heart has its reasons which reason does not know"³⁰.

Furthermore, originality is achieved through sensibility, considered to be "the faculty of feeling, the capacity for extremely refined emotion and quickness to display compassion for suffering, an innate sensitiveness or susceptibility revealing itself in a variety of spontaneous activities such as crying, swooning and kneeling"³¹.

Romantic writers often considered that words are not enough, are not able to express all that amount of feelings to be found in his soul. This is beautifully expressed by Becquer, who in the "symphonic introduction" to his Rhymes writes³²:

Huddled and naked in the dark corners of my brain, the wild children of my fantasy are sleeping, waiting in silence for the artistry which can dress them with words so that they can make their appearance on the stage of the world. (...) They are bound to me, destined to die with me without leaving a trace, like a dream during the night that is completely forgotten by morning. (...) between the world of the idea and that of form there is an abyss that only words can fill, and they are timid and hesitant and refuse to cooperate in this effort!

And later, in Rhyme 1 he refers to language as a mean-spirited language: *I would like to write it / by mastering man's poor, inadequate language.*

3. The struggle to overcome the rips up of Modernity

In Romanticism the duty of the self is to reach a solution to the process of rupture and rejection that inaugurated modernity in order to reconcile human beings and the idea of nature with themselves. The dark side of human nature is not anymore rejected and on the contrary becomes the hallmark as in the last verses of Voltaire's poem on *The Lisbon Disaster* (1755)³³:

A caliph once, when his last hour had come, / This prayer addressed to Him he revered: / To thee, sole and all-powerful king, I bear / What thou dost lack in thy immensity - Evil and ignorance, distress and sin. / He might have added one thing further - hope.

Schelling³⁴ declared that man freed himself and only himself everywhere. He supports the existence of an outer world opposite to the inner world ("I"). Intuition makes the synthesis between the One ("I") and the Whole (nature). The Self, the One is approaching the external world to engage him, coexist with him and reconcile with him. The subject believes in a vision of something that is beyond anything that can be perceived by essential intuition in an atmosphere of freedom.

4. Anxiety and feelings of loneliness

Selfhood and freedom are achieved at a price, which is usually a deep sense of loneliness and emptiness. The soul of man is his own enemy within, identifiable with an incurable obsession with the impossible, which deprives him of the power for the enjoyment of life. The break with order, security, and obedience is accompanied by a painful sense of rupture, and the individual suddenly finds himself or herself alone.

The romantic individual realizes, in the depths of his soul, that playing to be a new almighty god, alone in its remote heaven, is not more than a psychological

compensation to escape from their horrible sense of human loneliness. The romantic individual is lonely because he feels abandoned. Meléndez Valdés (1777) recognizes his own disturbing situation:

"In spite of my pain imploring heaven, / my torment does not abate, no, / nor can I, ay! stop my moan, / orphan, young, alone and helpless"³⁵.

Sixty years later (1838) Alfred de Musset took up the same idea:

"Me voilà seul, errant, fragile et misérable".³⁶

This is undoubtedly the root of human pessimism, anxiety, melancholy, the "disease of the century": the individual begins to experience the feeling of an unabridged dissatisfaction - so admirably expressed by romantic writers who, in their attempt to express their own sufferings, also express the anguishes of modern Western culture -. Romantic people cannot find a meaning of their world or their own lives. It's a *universal nuisance*³⁵, the romantic cosmic pain, later called *mal du siècle* and *Weltschmerz*, fever of the century, boredom or spleen, who in a text of Avellaneda is described thus:

"What kind of evil do you suffer on?", asks the Queen to his son and he replies "Existence!"³⁷.

The loss of external anchorages, the solitude of the self, the fact that human essence is now thought to be beyond the realm of the conscious and the rational, the split between reason and feeling, between the real and the unreal turn our of the Romantic and post-Romantic human being into an anguished individual, unable to find a place of comfort where his overwhelming worries be assuaged.

In summary, quoting Diderot:

Do you want to know the short history of almost all of our misery? It is this. There was a natural man; within this man there is an artificial man raised in the cave a civil war that lasts a lifetime. As soon as the natural man is the strongest, he is shot down by the moral and artificial man; and in every occasion, the sad monster is chained, tormented, extended over the wheel; moaning incessantly, relentlessly wretched, already carry clutch a false enthusiasm of glory or slouch it and fold a false shame.³⁷

Romanticism inaugurates the Age of Schizophrenia. The ancient *Weltanschauung* which persisted until the end of the Middle Ages and the early Modernism, was abruptly replaced by Romanticism, which destroyed all barriers opposed to irrationality, and therefore to the manifestations of schizophrenia.

DADA, SURREALISM AND POST-MODERNITY

Dada and Surrealism

Romanticism in particular and Modernism in general have been followed by several other trends and movements which we consider in their relation with the eclosion and maintenance of schizophrenic illness in Western societies. To begin with, we should say, that none of them delved so deeply in the ruptures of Modernity and in the efforts to overcome them as some Romantic poets and philosophers did. Essentially, the post-Romantic movements have attempted to bring forward repressed features of human nature in order to replace the consequences of extreme rationalism and not to reconcile the contradictions of human nature.

Rationalism went out of control with the outbreak of the First World War and the reaction was to replace it by recuperating the richness of the non-rational elements in ourselves. The reaction to the Second World War went in another direction, articulated around emerging existentialist perspectives. This was a more "internalized" reaction. López Ibor^{38,39} first described that the neurotic manifestations of soldiers in the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) were different from those described during the First World War. The last one were of an hysterical nature, trembling of the limbs being the most common symptom, while twenty years later reactions became more psychosomatic. The reason is that in the Great War fighting took place mainly at the front, with soldiers as the main actors, while in the Spanish Civil War the suffering and toll of civilians at the rearguard equaled those of the front. In the first case, soldiers suffering from "shell shock" were evacuated to cities where they found "a public" for their hysterical symptoms, while in the second the civilians, also sufferers of the conflict consisted more on protagonists of the conflict than mere spectators. This process of internalization was described also in Second World War and latter confrontations.

Surrealism is a cultural movement that began in the early 1920s, and is best known for its visual artworks and writings. The aim of Surrealism was to resolve previously contradictory conditions of dream and reality. Artists painted unnerving, illogical scenes with photographic precision, created strange creatures from everyday objects and developed painting techniques that allowed the unconscious to express itself⁴⁰. André Breton, the founder of Surrealism was explicit in his assertion that it was above all a revolutionary movement:

*"Disrespect has heightened everything, denial of established values has become total, indeed, a tabula rasa has been created"*⁴¹.

André Breton, who had trained in medicine and psychiatry, served in a neurological hospital where he used Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytic methods with soldiers suffering from shell-shock. It is perhaps not all together strange that its first Surrealist manifesto was written by André Breton⁴². The surrealist movement recognized that *"Surrealism was born in a psychiatric hospital"*⁴³.

Surrealism is a development of Dadaism, which was born out of a reaction against to the horrors of First World War. Dada rejected reason and logic, prizing nonsense, irrationality and intuition⁴⁴. Although a major point of Dada is that it is not supposed to be a movement, several of the artists released manifestos (i.e., The First Dada Manifesto by Hugo Ball of July 14, 1916)⁴⁵. Dada laid the foundations of Surrealism and is been considered to be the prelude to post-Modernism⁴⁶.

Breton joined in Dada activities with Louis Aragon and Philippe Soupault and they began experimenting with automatic writing and dictation of thought in the absence of any control exerted by reason, independent any aesthetic and moral preoccupation. Breton defined Surrealism as:

*"Pure psychic automatism, by which one proposes to express, either verbally, in writing, or by any other manner, the real functioning of thinking"*⁴¹

Freud's research with free associations, dream analysis, and the unconscious, was of utmost importance to the Surrealists in developing methods to liberate imagination, while rejecting the idea of an underlying insanity. Salvador Dali explained it as: *"There is only one difference between an insane person and myself. I am not insane"*⁴⁷.

Breton included the idea of the startling juxtapositions in his 1924 manifesto. He took the idea from an essay by poet Pierre Reverdy (published in 1918), which went on like this:

*"a juxtaposition of two more or less distant realities. The more the relationship between the two juxtaposed realities is distant and true, the stronger the image will be, the greater its emotional power and poetic reality"*⁴⁸

Freud criticized the methods of Surrealism because really the interest of Surrealists was not the unconscious but consciousness, meaning that the manifestations of and the experiments with psychic automatism, thought or the Surrealists to be important for the "liberation of the unconscious", were highly structured by ego activity, operating in a similar way as censorship in dreams⁴⁹. Therefore it was, in principle, a mistake to regard Surrealist poems and other art works as direct manifestations of the unconscious, since they were actually highly shaped and processed by the ego. In proper psychoanalysis, the

unconscious does not just express itself automatically but can only be uncovered through the analysis of resistance and transference in the psychoanalytic process.

On the other hand, in French Psychiatry automatism is a nuclear feature of mental illness. From this perspective, it is not surprising that the relationship between Surrealism and psychiatry has been close in France, much more than in other countries⁴³. Psychological automatism was described by Janet⁵⁰ in hysteria, and in his view it consisted in the spontaneous and inferior activity of consciousness, dominated by preorganized associations. Later on Janet used the word "subconscious" to refer to the same concept. Psychological automatism was believed to become manifest through automatic writing, as described by William James⁵¹. The *automatisme mental*^{52,53} was thought by Clérambault, to be the originator phenomenon of psychosis and is therefore very different from the psychological automatism. *Automatisme mental* is more closely related to Surrealism, and consists in the presence of a set of symptoms that arise out of the consciousness of the subject. The automatic appearance of an involuntary, neutral and athenatic, activity coincides with the passivity experiences mentioned by other authors. Clérambault distinguishes a "great automatism" or "triple automatism", mental, motor and sensory automatism. The end point of the developmental process is that the subject speaks endless, totally disconnected from any other person. There is a rupture of conversation itself, the possibility of an internal dialogue is broken and the dialogue with another person is impossible. Language speaks for itself only. It's like a cascade of words, it is simply a cascade of signifiers, according to Lacan^{54,55}. The clinical phenomena of psychosis are characterized by what Lacan calls dialectical inertia and reveal a deficit in the metaphorical pole of the language. The signifier of the symptom has lost its ties with the rest of the significant chain, is separated and remains isolated, as a signifier for the real thing. This is why Lacan refers to a significant automaton. For the surrealists language is ornamental in nature. In short, mental automation is one of the ways of displaying the ipseity alteration characteristic of schizophrenia.

At all events, the Surrealism effort is a metaphorical task⁵⁶ in which *"any combination of two significant would be equivalent to build a metaphor"*. This synthesis is alien to the psychotic patient where the *fortclusion* mechanism rejects crucial signifier. Those signifiers, expelled from the symbolic universe of the subject, are prevented from being integrated into the unconscious, from they can return but not in a symbolic manner as do the repressed contents in the dream or in neurotic symptoms. The *fortcluid* contents return in forms of hallucinations, that is to say, replacing the reality⁵⁵.

Post-Modernity

Post-Modernity brings new facets, brightly analysed by Dörr⁵⁷, including:

1. The preponderance of the technique:

*"nature has become a gigantic and unique 'service station', in a mere source of energy for modern industry"*¹⁴.

2. The overvaluation of labour and productivity, in such a way that work, employment and wages are confounded among themselves. Work and money, which were already important in the first half of the 19th century, have become in post-modern times almost in the only value.
3. Indiscretion and permanent and abusive invasion of people's privacy.
4. Obscenity, in such a way that the body loses its dignity and turns into a variety of surfaces, in a proliferation of objects, where seduction is lost. The body becomes metastatic and fractal, not anymore called to any form of resurrection⁵⁸.
5. The exclusiveness of the present. In postmodern times there is a barring or loss of the historical sense, of respect for the tradition and disappearance of the ideals and myths. The future loses consistency and ability to attract. Displacement of the interest towards visual experiences, which, by definition, are pure present. The experience of the present, condemning to oblivion questions so inherent to human beings such as where we came from, where we are going, i.e., the necessary and continuous call presence what was (the past) and what is to come (future).

Faced with this panorama Dörr⁵² considers that the question about meaning is becoming increasingly urgent and pressing. We have forgotten the true God and these other gods that we have worshipped over the last 150 years are betraying us. Isolated from God, lost among the countless consumer objects and the frantic search for increasingly strong affective experiences, post-Modern human beings seem to have lost the way and, therefore, the meaning⁵⁸. Emptiness and lack of sense invade us. There is no simple answer although there are two aspects which deserve to be recovered. The Word as "the dwelling place of being"⁵⁹, as a bridge that unites Earth and heaven, mortals and the gods, and the openness to the mystery and a hope in the transcendental life of human beings. Without these perspectives life on Earth makes no sense.

INSANITY, MODERNITY AND POSTMODERNITY

According to Sass^{60,61} there is a striking similarity between madness and Modernism. Among others shared characteristics, he mentions particularly: defiance of authority, nihilism, extreme relativism, distortions of time and bizarre transformations of self. The parallelism stands out when comparing the manifestations of schizophrenia with the works of such artists and writers as Kafka, Beckett, and Duchamp and philosophers including Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault and Derrida.

Sass considers the excess of self-consciousness, a doing of things by rules, a misplaced craving for certainty as the modern affliction.

The growth of excessive consciousness has profound consequences for the way we experience ourselves and the world. These consequences have been explored or expressed in much of the art and philosophy of the late 19th and 20th centuries, that is to say, in Modern and Post-Modern times. The cult of the ironic, distanced observer, aware of his own awareness, unable to break out of his solipsistic construction of himself and his world, has displaced what is now seen to be the naive, immediate relationship with reality as it is felt. This extreme consciousness pervades everything: The most intuitive acts become the object of exhaustive scrutiny. One's own thought processes start to appear alien and bizarre. Taken to an extreme, both feeling and acting become eventually impossible. The extreme manifestation of this phenomenon is the hyperreflexivity that characterises the "shattered mind" (*zerstört* in the original kraepelinean sense⁶²) of people who suffer from schizophrenic illness. The loss of the faculty of seeing things as a whole causes the mind to shatter. Consequently, everything has to be broken down into parts as in Bleuler's *Spaltung*⁶³. Thought processes lose their coherence; emotions are absent altogether or fail to cohere. Most strikingly, there is an altered relationship with external reality, characterised by delusions and hallucinations: what is "real" becomes uncertain, nothing can be trusted, the world becomes frightening and alien.

*"Madness ... is the end-point of the trajectory [that] consciousness follows when it separates from the body and the passions, and from the social and practical world, and turns in upon itself"*⁶¹.

Sass⁶⁰ argues that there is a close relation between philosophy and madness. The philosopher's "predilection for abstraction and alienation - for detachment from body, world and community" - produces an odd type of experiencing and understanding". The delusions that occur in schizophrenia are not failures of reasoning, but of appropriate feeling. Madness, from Sass's point of view, is "a self-deceiving condition, but one that is generated from

within rationality rather than by the loss of rationality". The process results in a hall-of-mirrors effect. Spontaneity is lost and disorganisation and fragmentation follow. What is called reality becomes alien and frightening.

One of us has written about the problem of truth in psychiatry⁶⁴ and, following Heidegger's concept of *aletheia*⁶⁵, came to the conclusion that truth is not something that can be imposed, it is something that should be reached in an interpersonal relation. As a result, the error of delusion is a lack of freedom and also a lack of communication. Blankenburg⁶⁶ explains it through one of his patients whose poems contained almost identical to Rilke's luminous metaphors. What is the difference between the patient and the poet? At the end of the analysis comes to the conclusion that only one: finished the poem, Rilke runs to his publisher to publish it and make it known while the sick leaves him, not keeping it even for himself. Thus we can understand what Hillman⁶⁷ and Ey⁶⁸ have written respectively that the difference between truth and delusions or hallucinations, is in the person, not in the content. A good example is what happens in delusions of jealousy and the futility and absurdity of materializing an infidelity - to make the delusion "true" - to chase away a delusion of jealousy. The jealous person is caught in a deviant relationship, where love is replaced by an excessive desire for possession and ownership that freezes the relationship and makes it impossible.

In *Madness and Modernism*⁶⁰ Sass compares the effects of these abnormalities of attention in schizophrenia and the nature of Modernist and Post-Modernist art and literature. What he aims to achieve is what Wittgenstein called: *the understanding which consists in "seeing connections"*⁶⁹, the use of analogy to make things make sense in a new way, rather than the tracing of a causal relationship.

As our sense of ourselves has become more and more narrowly identified with cerebral consciousness, the 'I' that underwrites that consciousness has come to deny its own reality. Like people with schizophrenia, we oscillate between omnipotence and impotence. Everything we experience we create ourselves, yet on closer inspection those selves turn out to be a mirage. This loss of what Sass calls the "sense of grounding in the lived body" carries over to others, who are seen as not really experiencing, but merely counterfeiting, feelings. Patients with schizophrenia describe an emptying out of meaning, with thought become so abstract as to attain a sort of ineffable vacuity. They may feel themselves entirely emptied of emotion, too, except for a pervasive feeling of anxiety or nausea in the face of the sheer existence of things.

Much Modernist and Post-Modernist art is seen by Sass as reaching for control over the more threatening aspects of

reality. At the same time the artist is forced to recognize that such control is, in the end, illusory. One response to this is to proclaim that the whole thing - the threat and the means of neutralizing it - is a game. When artists and critics speak of the "ludic" in art, it may sound innocent enough. But one might instead see it as an uneasy power-game, played out by the artist or critic with his audience.

The parallelism between 20th-century art and schizophrenia is difficult to explain. In the first place people with schizophrenia do not show the creativity of those with bipolar disorder. However, there are characteristics of schizophrenia which might, in their milder forms, be useful to writers and painters. Sass contrasts the "look", which examines objects that have a prior claim on our interest, with the "stare", which makes things interesting by the very fact of being looked at. This staring attention is highly characteristic of schizophrenia, where apparently random facts or objects take on an unspecifiable significance, and Modernism is characterized by what Heller⁷⁰, writing about Rilke, described as "*the inflationary increase of significances*": meanings and symbols loose from their moorings, which point reflexively to meaningfulness and the symbolic. Then again, people suffering from schizophrenia may have an advantage in tasks which require breaking free from normal conceptions and accepted practices. Their fluidity of perspective is peculiarly congenial to some forms of Modernism and Post-Modernism, in which an impersonal novelty based on disconcerting perspectives supplants the Romantic cult of originality founded in the personality and "inner life" of the artist. But Sass, perhaps wisely, leaves the question of the connection between schizophrenia and Modernism unanswered. Following we try to give an answer to this most intriguing matter.

THE DISCOVERY OF INTIMACY

The real issue of romantic literature or art is not the external world but the intimate psychological life, the psychic space that becomes deeper and abysmal. Thus romantic texts lead the reader to confound the real writer-person narrator with the subject or the character of the action created by the text.

The key to explain the outbreak of schizophrenia is what we refer as the discovery of intimacy. The verb "intimate" means 'to state or make known' and intimating underlines the meanings of "intimate" when used as a noun and adjective. The noun "intimate" means a person with whom one has a particularly close relationship. Anthropologists use the expression "inside information" from within a particular cultural setting by establishing networks of intimates capable and willing to provide information unobtainable through formal channels. The adjective, "intimate" indicates

detailed knowledge of a thing or person, including what we would today call the private world of each of us. Intimacy and privacy go hand in hand.

Ellenberger⁷¹ has described how along the nineteenth century man progressively discovered the unconscious especially in the third part of his book devoted to the First Dynamic Psychiatry (1775-1900). Three decades before him López Ibor wrote "*on the discovery of intimacy*"⁷². Up until them, intimacy and privacy were neglected. For instance, Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics⁷³ clearly states: *Man must avoid any chatter about others and himself*. In a similar way the Confessions of St. Augustine⁷⁴ have only one psychological purpose: to show that the human soul is ripped apart and sprayed if not lump together around its relationship with God:

"Lord, I will not quit until you gather all fragments of myself from my deformity, and unite them for eternity into the peace of our homeland."

It is not only until Balzac's *Louis Lambert* (1832) that a distinction between "inward" and "outward" being in human nature is clearly stated^{75,76}. On the other hand, extending the Id to the somatic element, as Freud did⁷⁷, had the immediate consequence of the access of opening the body to the sphere of intimacy and also to identity¹².

Intimacy is, in the meaning that here we are referring to, equivalent to inner-self or ipseity. All these concepts are a product of Romanticism. We want to mean that until Romanticism human beings lacked the perspective of having an intimate world of themselves and that this knowledge emerged as a sudden and developed along the nineteenth century.

The new attitude is inaugurated, most expressively, by Rousseau (1712-1778) in *Les Confessions*⁷⁸, written between 1765 and 1770 and published between 1782 and 1789, where he writes:

I have entered upon a performance which is without example, whose accomplishment will have no imitator. I mean to present my fellow-mortals with a man in all the integrity of nature; and this man shall be myself.

I know my heart, and have studied mankind; I am not made like any one I have been acquainted with, perhaps like no one in existence; if not better, I at least claim originality, and whether Nature did wisely in breaking the mold with which she formed me, can only be determined after having read this work.

Whenever the last trumpet shall sound, I will present myself before the sovereign judge with this book in my hand, and loudly proclaim, thus have I acted; these were my thoughts; such was I. With equal freedom and veracity have I related what was laudable or wicked, I

have concealed no crimes, added no virtues; and if I have sometimes introduced superfluous ornament, it was merely to occupy a void occasioned by defect of memory: I may have supposed that certain, which I only knew to be probable, but have never asserted as truth, a conscious falsehood. Such as I was, I have declared myself; sometimes vile and despicable, at others, virtuous, generous and sublime.

And later on, he comes to describe feelings that border on paranoid perceptions. The issue of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's paranoia has been widely discussed, even by himself. In 1776, Rousseau unveils a manuscript on he had been working for years, *Rousseau, Judge of Jean-Jacques*^{79,80} which is a denunciation of an alleged conspiracy of Rousseau's enemies, those philosophers involved with the *Encyclopédie*, specially Diderot and Voltaire. In *Les Confessions* he writes:

The ceiling under which I write has eyes; the walls of my chamber have ears. Surrounded by spies and by vigilant and malevolent inspectors, disturbed, and my attention diverted, I hastily commit to paper a few broken sentences, which I have scarcely time to read, and still less to correct. I know that, notwithstanding the barriers which are multiplied around me, my enemies are afraid truth should escape by some little opening. What means can I take to introduce it to the world? This, however, I attempt with but few hopes of success.

Alone, naked, proud, Rousseau envisages to present himself before the sovereign judge with no other property than his *Confessions*, having studied mankind and being aware of the fact that he is an unrepeatable being. The ancient and medieval *Weltanschauung* is absent from this text. There is no *Logos*, there is no *Verbum* there is no harmony, there is no supreme meaning, there is,... just Jean-Jacques. From then on, men and women had to live and cope with the anxiety of not finding a meaning beyond him. What seems to us fascinating is that this tremendously powerful affirmation of oneself suddenly makes Rousseau to slide into self-reference ideas.

The I of Descartes

Greenfeld has created the expression² to refer to the sentence: "*je pense, donc je suis*". There is no better way to define modernity: five words, two of them "I".

The "I of Descartes" is consciousness turned upon itself: It is the "I of self-consciousness", the only certain knowledge available to us, upon which every other knowledge is build. It is an absolute knowledge, impossible to doubt it.

The "I of Descartes" is the one among mental processes which is *explicitly symbolic*². This statement gains full meaning if we consider, as we have done elsewhere, that thinking and speaking are the manifestations of the same phenomenon, the Greek *Logos*. As a consequence, "*je pense*" is not only an experience of the mind, it is also a cultural event.

Greenfeld² argues that an active "I of Descartes", often combined with acute intelligence, may lead to insanity as well as to genius, and is more likely to lead to the latter. Instead of being the "I of self-consciousness", which the "I of Descartes" is by definition, it must become the I of unwilling self-consciousness, culture not individualized observing the mind and experienced as an alien presence within the self.

Rousseau's attitude was not just an isolated, idiosyncratic, phenomenon; Goethe's *The Sorrows of Young Werther* appeared in 1774⁸¹. Furthermore Rousseau's *Réveries* were written between 1776 and 1778 and published posthumously in 1782⁸². In his *Reveries of a Solitary Walker*, Rousseau writes:

*So here I am, all alone on this earth, with no brother, neighbour, or friend, and no company but my own. The most sociable and loving of human beings has by common consent been banished by the rest of society. In the refinement of their hatred they have continued to seek out the cruellest forms of torture for my sensitive soul, and they have brutally severed all the ties which bound me to them*⁸².

Chateaubriand comments this text of Rousseau⁸³ in the following way: *isolating himself from the company of other men, abandoning himself to his dreams, he made masses of young people believe that it is beautiful to thus throw oneself into the wave of life.*

Our hypothesis is that the *Weltanschauung* of late Modernism, of Romanticism, as launched by Rousseau is unbearable for people vulnerable to schizophrenia and the core manifestations of the disease exposed above need some kind of scaffolding in a period when humankind has run out of all the available support.

THE CASE OF DON QUIXOTE

Cervantes' masterpiece is timeless - and space less -, the first sentence of his novel is: *In a village of La Mancha, the name of which I have no desire to call to mind*, is as fresh today as it was in any moment since it was published. The reason is that the book is about human life in general⁸⁴, about its deepest secrets:

You can see in Don Quixote, on each page, revealed the more arcane secrets of the human soul. (...) Worldwide

there is no work of fiction more deep and strong than that. So far represents the supreme and ultimate expression of human thought, the most bitter irony that can make the man, and if you stop the world and someone ask men: «Now, what have you removed in your life clean and definitive conclusion have deduced it?», could men show Don Quixote in silence and then say: 'this is my conclusion about life and (...) would you condemn me for it?'⁸⁵.

The story of Don Quixote deals with the crisis initiated by modernity while addressing issues rose not only at the early 17th century, but generation after generation up to the present day⁸⁶. Early Modernism and Classicism, late Modernism and Romanticism and post-Modern themes and worries are recurrent in the two editions of *The Ingenious Gentleman Don Quixote of La Mancha*.

The beginning of the 17th century is the end of the chivalric ideal and the beginning of the reign of the goddess reason. In Spain it is also the period of the Counter-Reformation or Catholic Reformation (1560-1648) and the aftermath of the Council of Trent and of the great Catholic reaction against Luther Reform. The Protestant Reform has been considered as one of the pillars of Modernism⁸⁷. In the midst of a deep social and intellectual crisis, Cervantes stands himself not only as chronicler but like a watchman with long range views, warning about the consequences of this transition to a modern world. He sees the dangers of this world were common sense and rationality imprisoned the everyday reality of Alonso Quijano in a nameless village of La Mancha. The rationalization of modern society, culminating in the Age of Enlightenment is unacceptable for Don Quixote, who thus stands out as a proto-Romantic, confronting a generalized process of homogenization, uniformity and loss of freedom.

The shaping of an identity

Alonso Quijano is described in the first page of *The Ingenious Gentleman* which a series of personal attributes and belongings which would characterise forever an individual in pre-Modern times:

One of those gentlemen that keep a lance in the lance-rack, an old buckler, a lean hack, and a greyhound for coursing. An olla of rather more beef than mutton, a salad on most nights, scraps on Saturdays, lentils on Fridays, and a pigeon or so extra on Sundays, made away with three-quarters of his income. (...) The age of this gentleman of ours was bordering on fifty; he was of a hardy habit, spare, gaunt-featured, a very early riser and a great sportsman. They will have it his surname was Quixada or Quesada (for here there is

some difference of opinion among the authors who write on the subject), although from reasonable conjectures it seems plain that he was called Quexana. This, however, is of but little importance to our tale; it will be enough not to stray a hair's breadth from the truth in the telling of it.

But suddenly our protagonist assumes a new identity and gives names not only himself (*Don Quixote*) but also his horse (*Rocinante*) his dame (*Dulcinea*) adding information about their (noble) origins (*La Mancha, El Toboso*). From then on there is no alternative for Don Quixote: his new identity is the source of an immense number of opportunities but also of worries and disasters.

Don Quixote and the dilemma of modernity

Insanity and reason

Cervantes does not deal with irrationality by segregating it from reason in a classic Foucaultian way. On the contrary, the whole *The Ingenious Gentleman* is a dialogue between reason and insanity at many levels: Don Quixote and Sancho Panza, each one of them internally and with the rest of the characters of the novel. Even Cervantes himself seems to join when - especially in the second part - bit by bit Don Quixote craziness stops being described in the earlier, comical, sometimes hilarious and even vulgar way, and is presented in a more human guise.

The coexistence of insanity and reality is essential in *The Ingenious Gentleman*. Cervantes was compelled to consider both in order avoid a story by a modest philosopher, proud of his high mission⁸⁸.

López Ibor considers that even in his fully developed craziness Don Quixote was amazingly lucid and that both, craziness and lucidity were present in him as well that in Sancho Panza. From this standpoint, López Ibor goes on to draw conclusions for psychiatry itself:

The interest of psychiatry is the dialogue between sanity and madness, between reason and insanity. There is no absolute insane. There is no absolute sane. Human beings make out of their life an adventure open to the real world and to the possible world. (...) Let your studies and research, your discussions and encounters help the world to achieve the coexistence between madness and sanity become a dialogue of peace, instead of a horrific blast of anxiety and incomprehension. If we understand better our patients, we sane people, will understand better ourselves⁸⁹.

Our contemporary, post-Modern society is characterized by religious, political, national, ethnic and cultural pluralism.

The great variety of existing cultural patterns makes difficult any process of identification. Pluralism represents an obstacle for any absolute value or decision and the consequence is a feeling of chaos⁹⁰.

Cervantes wrote the second part of the book to avoid apocryphal editions and in order to be successful he had to include Don Quixote passing away. However, there may be another reason which is congruent with the changing attitude of the author's relationship with his creature, becoming more humane along the second part of the book. Don Quixote's death is a prodigy of dignity and even at the last moment there is no confrontation of rationality and insanity, being a fortune to live insane and die sane, as stated in his epitaph:

He had everyone in little, / was the scarecrow and bogeyman in the world, / in such circumstances, / which credited his fortune / die sane and insane live.

Reality and illusion in Cervantes

Cervantes manages a concept of reality which is post-Modern. The question of how we experience reality or better how we cope with multiple realities is considered in the *Don Quixote*. Ortega y Gasset⁹¹ considers two levels of reality, one being the materiality of things, the other, the meaning. From this standpoint, he analyses Don Quixote's obvious madness. But the problem is not solved by declaring him insane just because he takes the windmills for giants. What in Don Quixote was abnormal was already normal, and will be so in the future. It is true that the windmills were not giants, but, what about the giants themselves. Where have human beings found these giants? Nowhere, because giants do not exist, nor have giants ever existed. In any case, the moment that man thought for the first time in giants may have been not very dissimilar from Don Quixote's experience of them⁹¹.

Alone the experiencing self can judge what the estimation of reality is assigned to a subuniverse. Furthermore, the intersubjective experience, the communication, and the sharing something all imply, in the end, faith in the veracity of the other. They imply that I presume the possibility of the Other and, on the other hand, presupposes that I also have possibilities to define are is my dreams, my fantasies and my real life⁹². In a sense the dialogues of Don Quixote with Sancho Panza, and with the rest of the characters, even with Cervantes himself depicted as chronicler and carrying out a research to find and translate the texts of Cide Hamete Benengeli, like a present day journalist, are close to the issue of the problem of truth, as raised by Heidegger⁶⁵. In short the method of approaching the truth is a process of uncovering (*aletheia*), the we mention elsewhere in this paper.

THE CASE OF HÖLDERLIN

We should assume that our hypothesis may be too speculative unless we find more solid evidence of features from the Late Modern Age and Romanticism embedded with personal events and with the psychopathology of schizophrenia, including the core Gestalt of the disease. The difficulty is overwhelming as there are no personal testimonies from early periods. Besides, the poor knowledge that physicians could have about a disease that was only described a century later, and the complexities of the disease itself make the task almost impossible. Nevertheless we believe that there is one case where Romanticism and schizophrenia go hand in hand and this is personified in the great poet Johann Christian Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–1843). In what follows we will summarize the important facts of his life and disease to then consider how the features of Romanticism are present in his main philosophical and literary productions and how the struggle to overcome the anxieties produced in him as a result of his creative effort developed into a severe mental derangement, taking the form of a schizophrenia.

Biographical outline

Hölderlin was born in Lauffen am Neckar in 1770. His father, the manager of a church estate, died when he was two years old. He was brought up by his mother, who in 1774 married the Mayor of Nürtingen and moved to this town. The major died when the poet was nine years old.

Hölderlin studied theology at the Tübingen Stift, a Protestant Seminary, where among his fellow students were Hegel and Schelling. Convinced that he could not sustain the Christian faith, Hölderlin declined to become a minister of religion himself and instead found employment as a private tutor. In 1793–94 he began writing his novel *Hyperion*. Between 1796 and 1798 he worked for the family of the banker Jakob Gontard, and soon Hölderlin started a love relationship with his wife Susette, who became a most important person in the poet's life. Hölderlin addressed her, in his poetry under the name of "Diotima". The affair was discovered and Hölderlin was harshly dismissed by Jakob Gontarg. Susette died in 1802 from rubeola or influenza. Hölderlin got two further employments as tutor, one in Stuttgart (in 1800) and a second one in Bordeaux (in 1802). Soon after he fall ill.

Although by the year 1800 Hölderlin, who then was 30 years old, had manifested some symptoms of "hypochondria", a full-blown clinical picture did not appear until 1805 when he was admitted into a clinic in Tübingen under the care of Dr. Ferdinand Autenrieth. The following year he was discharged as incurable and given three years to live. The

carpenter Ernst Zimmer, a learned man who, among many other philosophical and non-philosophical books had read *Hyperion*, accommodated him at his home, a tower in the old city wall of Tübingen. Zimmer and his family cared for Hölderlin until his death in 1843, 36 years later. During this long period at the tower, Hölderlin would occasionally write ingenuous rhymed quatrains, sometimes of a childlike beauty, which he would sign with fantastic names (Scardanelli, Salvator Rosa, Rosetti, Buonarrotti, Killalusimeno) and gave fictitious dates from the previous or future centuries.

Some authors have challenged the diagnosis of schizophrenia, although without sufficient evidence. Wilhelm Lange-Eichbaum⁹³ pathography reaches the conclusion that Hölderlin suffered from a psychopathy, "an innate nervousness" since his youth, which led during the course of his life to several episodes of depression, and finally at the beginning of his 30 years, gradually and insidiously into a catatonia, a subcategory of dementia praecox. The French Germanist Bertaux^{94,95} has tried to demonstrate that Hölderlin was not insane but was just pretending to be sick, and that he had begun to simulate for noble motives. Bertaux maintains that the legend of Hölderlin's mental disease has spread without criticism because of its Romantic appeal. However, the evidence put forward by Bertaux is biased with false, defamatory data, borrowed from antipsychiatry. Today there is no reason to doubt about Hölderlin's mental disease, being it a schizophrenia^{93,96,97}, or a disorder from the spectrum of schizophrenia (i.e., schizophasia)⁹⁸.

Wilhelm Waiblinger, a young poet and admirer, left a poignant account of Hölderlin's day-to-day life during these long and apparently empty years⁹⁹:

"... Now if one were to step into this unfortunate man's house, he certainly would not expect to meet a poet who had merrily wandered along the Ilyssus with Plato; but the house is not ugly, it is the dwelling of a prosperous carpenter; a man who has an uncommon degree of culture for a man of his standing, and who speaks about Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Novalis, Tieck and others. One inquires after the room of Herr Librarian - for Hölderlin still enjoys being addressed by title - and then comes to a small door. Talking can already be heard inside, and one assumes that Hölderlin already has company, but is then told by the honest carpenter that H. is completely alone and talks to himself day and night (...). Opening the door, one finds a haggard figure standing in the middle of the room, who bows as deeply as possible and will not stop bestowing compliments, and whose mannerisms would be very graceful were there not something convulsive about them (...). One says a few introductory words which are then received

with the most courteous obeisance and a deluge of nonsensical words which confuse the visiting stranger (...) he becomes extremely perplexed if the visitor attempts to follow up a train of thought... The visitor finds himself addressed as "Your Majesty", "Your Holiness", and "Merciful Herr Pater" (...). Toward complete strangers he speaks absolute nonsense (...). Conz told me that Hölderlin once leaned over him and read aloud a few verses from Aeschylus, whereupon he then shrieked out in convulsive laughter: "I don't understand that. It's kamalatta language," for the coining of new words is one of Hölderlin's eccentricities... The remaining part of the day elapses in monologues and pacing back and forth in his little room (...). Hölderlin has become incapable of concentrating on a thought, clarifying it, following it up, drawing an analogy to it, and of connecting it in a regular sequence via intermediary terms to something seemingly remote. (...) his life is an entirely inner one, and this is certainly one of the reasons why he has sunken into this state of apathy, the extrication from which has been rendered impossible by his physical sluggishness and unbelievably weakened nerves".

Philosophical and literary production of Hölderlin and his psychopathology

There is a particularly high degree of coincidence between Hölderlin's inner condition and his literary production as is the case in most Romantic writers. Long stretches of his entire creation and particularly in the *Hyperion* are pure expressions of his intimate condition.

Some of the discussions on the relationship between Hölderlin's biography and some of his poetic motifs against the background of recent schizophrenia research have been published from psychoanalytic perspectives¹⁰⁰. Several of them put an emphasis on the inextricable entanglement of self-healing and destructive processes, for instance in Hölderlin's relationship with his mother. It should be remembered that Hölderlin's father died when the Hölderlin was two years old and there is evidence in some of his correspondence (i.e., with deacon of Nürtingen) that the longing for a father figure in somebody raised in a highly feminized environment, was present rather constantly. In a letter to his mother, Hölderlin seeks to explain that he cannot marry and settle as a protestant pastor, as would be her desire.

"For years and days," Hölderlin writes, he has had firmly in mind, "never to marry." He complemented his statement with these words: "My strange character, my moods, my penchant for projects and (just to tell the truth), my ambition - all traits that can never be

eradicated without a risk - do not let me hope I'll be happy in a quiet marital status, on a peaceful parish".

Laplanche¹⁰¹ has made some important contributions to Freud's seduction theory, the hypothesis that a repressed memory of an early childhood sexual abuse or molestation experience was the essential precondition for hysterical or obsessional symptoms. Laplanche proposed a broader view of Freud's initial seduction theory as a general theory of the origins of the repressed unconscious, rather than a mere etiological hypothesis about neurotic symptoms. Laplanche cites "enigmatic signifiers" "transmitted via parental messages to the other" as being the key element in the formation of the unconscious: *"The enigma is in itself a seduction and its mechanisms are unconscious"*. Freud, repeatedly compared the psychoanalytic discovery to a Copernican revolution, but Laplanche considered early seduction theory as unfinished, and therefore unable to typify a Copernican approach but also Ptolemaic one. On the Copernican side, there is the conjoint discovery of the unconscious and the seduction theory, which maintains the sense of "otherness". On the Ptolemaic side, there is the misdirection of the Freudian return to a theory of self-centering *"where the ego feels it occupies the central position"*⁷⁷. Laplanche, under the influence of Hölderlin, mentions this perspective as being linked to the development of an Œdipus complex, and ultimately to the poet's narcissism - pointed out in several psychoanalytic texts. The Copernican vs Ptolemaic metaphors are fundamental to understand the ipseity concept in a late modernistic world.

Our hypothesis seems to be confirmed philosophical writings^{102,103} where Hölderlin considers human self and personal identity bring up over and over again, allusions to the experiences about himself and the world, about the relationship between freedom and attachment, between solipsism and holism, writings in which he anticipate later description of the basic characteristics of schizophrenia.

In what follows, we will consider Hölderlin's contributions to, and perspectives on, what we have considered as the main significant themes of late Modernism. Of course, the themes overlap among themselves and with other issues (such as the rise of secularization), but let us get hold of the rope-ends to follow our line of thought.

Selfhood and ipseity collapse in Hölderlin

A very detailed and thorough psycholinguistic analysis of all Hölderlin poems before and after the onset of his disease has been carried out by Supprian¹⁰⁴. His grammatical analysis of the poems revealed that they contained five essential linguistic factors. These factors were present throughout the poetic work of Hölderlin, before the illness,

at the onset of it, and during the entire course of it. A time series analysis on the distribution of the velocity of language changes, pointed a maximum at the time when the psychosis first became manifest. Three further maximums occur previously that were interpreted as being early signs of the schizophrenic process.

The impression that the language, especially in the late poetic works, becomes more and more monotonous is probably due to the shrinkage in the abundance of content to a few common themes. The most common nouns of the late work are: human, life, world, image, time, nature, and the most common verbs: make, walk, stand, come, say, to show oneself, appear, to shine, and to complete.

A radical change of the course is to be seen in two factors in the year 1801, that is to say, just before the onset of the "main psychosis" - to ignore for the moment previous vibrant changes with complicated relations, which require additional categorization.

In the years after 1801, the structure and punctuation of sentences deteriorate progressively and the number of isolated words increases significantly. The consequence is that the text loses meaningfulness, becomes idiosyncratic and autistic, and the words, isolated from a context no longer function for the purpose of communication. And so the way is paved for the appearance of neologisms. At the end of his life Hölderlin seemed to use a single word - or rather an un-word - , *"pallaksch"* which he used in the past to give a faltering answer that was neither yes nor no, and dependent on the context. The poet Celan¹⁰⁵ wrote:

Came, if there / came a man, / came a man to the world today, / with /the patriarchs' / light-beard he could, / if he spoke of / his time, he / could / only babble and babble / ever- ever- / moremore / (Pallaksch, Pallaksch).

A un-word for an un-language.

In the epochs of puberty and late puberty the Ego is dominating in Hölderlin's poems. For the first time in the relationship, the You leads at the time of the encounter with Diotima, albeit an interruption however. After the onset of the major psychosis the You and the I step behind the Id, and indeed eventually get completely lost.

Hölderlin and the rip up of modernity

Hölderlin understands human biography as an eccentric pathway, and for him, the intention to reunite subject and world is only possible symbolically in poetry. In his view, human nature is in itself eccentric, dual, because there is a centre and a periphery: thoughts and feelings belong to the intimacy while gestures and attitudes have their place at the

periphery. Thoughts manifest themselves in words and behaviour while feelings have their own way of being expressed. In primitive people, who lack an inner space, the whole life is peripheral, hence the importance of the masks in their rituals⁷².

People with schizophrenia are unable to see themselves in a consistent way as both an object and a subject, and this is the basic disturbance of behaviour which characterizes the disease itself¹⁰².

Waiblingen in his report on Hölderlin uses the same concept of Bleuler⁶³ (cited above) about the threads that unite mental activity:

"Hölderlin is unable to hold a thought to make it clear to pursue him, another to make it analog, and so to join them in regular order through intermediate links in order to reach the distant". He says "words without meaning and significance", "rather than a thread, which should combine the multiple, its going so many confused and lost in such a desolate dream, like a spider's web".

Truly, the incoherence of schizophrenia probably been rarely better described. Waiblingen mentioned neologisms and style changes, for example in the form stereotyped politeness, in the center of Hölderlin's language disorder.

Disturbances in the fundamental relationship between Subjectiveness (*Subjekthaftigkeit*) and Objectiveness (*Objekthaftigkeit*) in human self-awareness described by Dieter Henrich and already present in Hölderlin, correspond to the experience of the self that have been considered as the core of the psychopathology of schizophrenia¹⁰⁶⁻¹⁰⁹.

Johann Georg Fischer reports on a visit to Hölderlin in 1843¹¹⁰:

"Ah" he wrote, "do not talk to me of Diotima, what a creature! And you know: Thirteen sons she bore me, one is the Emperor of Russia, the other one King of Spain, the third Sultan, the fourth Pope and so on. And then you know what? After that he spoke in Swabian: "you know, as the Swabian say, she went crazy, crazy, crazy, crazy." He spoke this in such an excited manner, that we left, whilst he accompanied us to the door bowing deeply".

But who has now become really crazy? Diotima? or Hölderlin because of Diotima? Ostensibly, insanity becomes a characteristic of Diotima. In the deep structure, however, it reflects in this unfamiliar form Hölderlin's self-knowledge¹¹¹.

Hölderlin unveils the three radical anxieties of post-Romantic man represented in the blow to the traditional view according to which the human being has a special

place in all living things, a superiority over the rest of nature, and the sense of mastery associated with such claims: 1) Human beings no longer occupy a central place in the cosmos, because since Copernicus the Earth was not anymore the center of the universe; 2) thanks to Darwin humans have ceased to regard themselves as unique creatures on top of the rest of them, and 3) after Freud is no longer man master of himself as it is subjected to impulses that he or she can not control nor even always be fully conscious of them.

Hölderlin addresses what we have referred as the modern rupture in several parts of his work¹¹². The search of unity is the core of his philosophical system. In the preface of the penultimate edition of *Hyperion*, Hölderlin declares that as conscious beings we emerge from the "emotional unity", the "being", in which there is no difference between us and the world. We tear ourselves away from it, in order to restore it again through ourselves. Now we are disintegrated with nature, "and what was once one, as one can believe, one, is now in contradiction with us, and masters and domestics have changed places. Often it is to us as if the world is Everything and we were Nothing." As a consequence, the destiny of human beings is "to end the conflict between our Self and the World", "to unite with nature to an infinite whole." But the goal "where everything is one", can never be reached, human beings can only come closer in an asymptotical way, as the result of an infinitely extended process.

The self is simultaneously unique and multiple, static and dynamic, transparent and obscure, positive and negative. Simultaneously, the experience of the self is dual. López Ibor⁷² wrote:

"Don't ask "What am I?" but "Who am I?" "I have my instincts, my body, my habits, but I am also all that. The mystery of the self rests on the conjunction of having and being".

This duality of being is what emerges, incomprehensible, during deep anxiety states. Hölderlin and few others have confronted this core challenge of modernity by approaching the understanding of the unity of being. But this goal is unreachable, as the more you get close to the unity, the more impossible it becomes. As a consequence, the bottom of the abyss can only be attained by bordering the edge of insanity⁷².

Jung considers the self (*das Selbst*) in a quaternary way: eternal - ephemeral; singular - general; good - bad; spiritual - ctonic (the infernal forces). The question of what is really the self is answered by Jung in an astounding way: "It is God in us"⁷². Jung reaches the same conclusion as Hölderlin, the dilemma of modernity is beyond the scope of the pains and struggles of human nature. The key to disentangling them is in the hands of Hellenic gods to be recuperated as in Hölderlin or in the Jungian god omnipresent at the center of

mandalas. In neither case we are dealing with a personal god prone to a dialogue with man, rather this god is a fragile god, close to Heidegger's *Angst* or Sartre's *nausea*. At a certain stage Jung analyses a mandala by a patient and draws attention to the fact that in this case the center is empty, while in oriental mandalas the center is occupied by Buddha and in medieval circles such as wheel windows by the *Rex Gloriæ*. Again the vanishing of ipseity in patients suffering from schizophrenia.

The parallelism between Hölderlin's and Jung's titanic efforts is supported by the fact that the great Swiss analyst suffered himself psychotic episodes as the consequence of a "horrible confrontation with the unconscious" which he recorded in his *Liber Novus* also known as *Das Rote Buch*, which was not published until 48 years after his death¹¹³.

Arguably, biographical development consists in providing the means to reconcile self and non-self, the alien, the understanding. The power to achieve a unified understanding of self and world is a prerequisite of personal identity. On one hand, the self-conscious human being sees him/herself as a "person": "*He knows how to distinguish him/her from all others, but also knows that he like them belongs in the common world - that he, as person, is a living being and has a place among all the things of the world*". On the other hand, he/she recognise him/herself as "subject". The subject "*reaches out across the world as a whole and finds whatever he thinks or encounters in the same correlation as he has to the One that is, insofar as it knows of him/herself*"¹¹⁴.

The original and irreducible doubling in the self as a person and as a subject, "*as one among many and as one against all*" is the opposite of the predispositions to self-aggrandizement and self-limitation, egocentricity and indulgence present in Hölderlin. There are significant confrontations of ideas between the already ill Hölderlin and contemporary philosophers and comrades. According to Fichte, the existence of the "absolute I" that spans all of reality, is only possible through the separation between the "I Subject" and the "I Object" that constitutes reflection or self-consciousness. In contrast, Hölderlin proposes a new model which he calls "*Being in an absolute sense*". On a cognitive level, the advantage of this category is that, within it, in it the "unification" between the I Subject and the I Object, which Hölderlin expressed with the saying *Ich bin Ich*, is possible in reality and not just in the abstract. In this model one part cannot be split or separated from another, without hurting or without destroying the essence of the unit¹¹⁵.

Hölderlin's dictum may be fully appreciated if we compare it with Hamlet's words "*to be or not to be*" and Descartes axiom "*je pense donc je suis*". There is no dilemma

in Hamlet nor in Decartes, because only a living and fully conscious creature is capable of enunciating these two sentences. Furthermore, Hölderlin's *Ich bin Ich* incorporates everything that I am, and not only my soul as Descartes claimed. In a sense Romanticism incorporates everything in us, including what for centuries had been rejected as depraved.

In the phrase *Ich bin Ich*, Hölderlin tries to clarify the structure of intellectual intuition underlying self-consciousness. Cognitive reflection, i.e. self-consciousness is based on a self-contraposition and separation. Once a separation has taken place, the I recognises himself in the contradistinction as identical to himself¹¹⁶. That is to say, the model of "*Being in the absolute sense*" enables one to think Identity and Difference in a linked, unitary way, such that neither concept takes precedence over the other; in this way, a Unification that really ties and connects internally and intimately Subject and Object is achieved.

A second intellectual discrepancy occurred with Schiller. Hölderlin had presented his philosophy of unification in the *Hyperion* and the resulting controversy in philosophical circles is clearly described in a letter to Schiller¹¹⁶. In this letter Hölderlin tells his mentor that he has identified a culminating point that will facilitate the conscious progress of philosophy, which makes possible the Unification of Subject and Object into a Totality. Hölderlin specifies that this route of access to the Unification of the contradictions of human subjectivity is aesthetic, and in a cognitive sense has to be understood as a geometric approximation like the one of the square to the circle. At the same time this unification is only possible if associated - indicates Hölderlin - with a theory of immortality. Death seen from a vital and naturalistic view is not an absolute phenomenon. Human life is not destroyed when consciousness disappears, but being a spiritual energy, it integrates together with the matter within nature. "The One differentiated within itself" - translated here as "the harmoniously opposed" - is to be understood not as a synthesis, but as approximation of opposed, but the approach is so great that at the asymptotic point a very slight brush to infinity takes place, which eventually ends up connecting the individual with infinity or totality. Or in words of Hölderlin:

"It is not a mere opposition of the agreed, nor a mere relation and unification of the opposed and alternating, it is both things at the same time, the opposed and agreed are something non-detachable (unzertrennlich in the original German). This way in this model of the harmoniously opposed is not opposed as agreed, nor unified as opposed, but both are to be found in one, are felt as non-detachable agreed and opposed".

Secularization and the return to ancient gods in Hölderlin

Hölderlin tries to overcome another characteristic of modernity: secularization. For him, the individual finds him/herself bound by three types of relationships: 1) human beings are part of a "physical-mechanical-historical relationship", of the natural world, and they are characterized by "the intimate relationship, the sharing of the one with another, the inseparability of the parts"; 2) human beings as part of an "intellectual, moral, law relationship" are free individuals in the world in an intellectual context, characterized by "same side by side" and 3) human beings share "a religious relationship" by virtue of which the opposite trends of these two types of relationship are canceled out. Religious intellectual historical relationships are the expression of a higher correlation between the human being and the world, in which "they and their world, and everything what they have and what they are, is felt as united".

The ambiguity of the absent god and the longing for a gentle beneficent god is not solved in Hölderlin's poems. This ambiguity represents the inescapable response of man shocked by the blaze of divinity, annihilated by the numinous. Hölderlin seems to assume the fated task "with such intensity that it often seems, especially in his later fragments, that his entire being, his own precarious and fragile psychic balance, hinges on one word or phrase; or, even more terrifyingly, that he desperately avoids pitching himself into the crevices and blank spaces of his own poetry, into the literal emptiness between the words on the white page that lurk there threatening to engulf him. Sometimes he gives different answers, even within the same poem, to this burning question of poetic calling. At other times, his poetry seems as if precipitated into a kind of mutism by this same god's vortex and self-removal".¹¹⁵

Hölderlin's solution is extraordinary. According to the poet, subjectivity has to renounce to its loneliness and relate to a third sphere which, together with the subject and the object, makes it possible for the "differentiation" to lean on it¹¹⁵. Again, it is an effort to overcome secularization.

Hölderlin explicitly notes that mankind in his Rousseauian childhood, had been integrated into nature and had lived without destructive contradictions. Already then being in relationship with the Divine, with the original Being, the Being which, as we have seen is the meta-basis of nature because it supports it being in itself unknown. But that unity of identity and difference in the mists of time, was given to man externally, and man was therefore without freedom and knowledge. So, that harmonious life with nature had to be broken, if man wanted to re-establish the unity of Identity and Difference in a full and self-generated

way. Hölderlin's unification attempts in his novel *Hyperion*, show precisely this return of man to his original harmony with nature, but this time unit has been built by man itself, and that is his difference with the times of Arcadia. The interest and longing for the ancient Greek world destroyed by early Modernism, is the expression of the same effort, to sustain remembrance of the ancient times when gods were omnipresent, sharing places, elements, planets, constellations, and even temperaments. Hölderlin's poetry attempts to call the gods into being by naming them and invoking their powers, features, attributes and even their geographical habitats. The gods are found in the perilous content of his poetry, in its later fractured form and style and, most tragically, in the destruction of his personality and identity. Through modalities of disappearance and loss, his poetry establishes a site, a place, for the god who comes and goes, whose absence is our only guarantor of its presence:

*Nah ist / Und schwer zu fassen der Gott*¹¹⁷.

(Near is / and (therefore) hard to grasp is the God.)

According to Hölderlin, modern man, who lives torn in his identity, immersed in its contradictions, living without giving answers to the question of the knowledge of ethics and metaphysics, in the hands of scepticism and nihilism, with the sword of death and destiny over his head, has a way to overcome all these dissonances. This way can be found in the experience of true and passionate love and in an individual's complete religious-aesthetic apprehension of nature. And so, modern man will finally connect freely with the Totality of Life, in a transcendental sphere that we do not yet know, and which will allow us to give a meaning and significance to our lives and our contradictions. So, scepticism will become only a memory. We will feel a feeling beyond the dichotomy rationality-irrationality, giving us access to the infinity, without losing our identity we approach the infinite although we will never know its true nature¹¹⁵.

Did Hölderlin go too far in his philosophical musings?

Did Hölderlin go too far? Did he go beyond his strengths? It may be so. A poem that Hegel dedicated to him appears to support this possibility. Hegel wrote the poem *Eleusis*¹¹⁸, in August 1796 and dedicated it to Hölderlin, his close friend since they were students at the Tübingen Stift. The poem refers the sacred ecstatic experiences at Eleusis Holy Night, in which Demeter, the goddess of the earth, gives birth to Dionysus.

Once written, Hegel decided to cross out the following seven verses which we present in its original German and in an English translation. What is most important is that the

crossed out verses could have been written by Hölderlin himself, something that led Mayos¹¹⁹ to propose a thought-provoking analysis of the differences between Hegel and Hölderlin when considering the role of phantasy in the approach to reality.

Der Sinn verliert sich in dem Anschauen, / Was mein ich nannte schwindet, / Ich gebe mich dem Unermeslichen dahin, / Ich bin in ihm, bin alles, bin nur es. / Dem wiederkehrenden Gedanken fremdet, / Ihm graut vor dem Unendlichen, und staunend fast / Er dieses Anschauens Tiefe nicht.

Sense loses itself in the gazing, / What I call mine disappears / I give myself to the infinite, / I am in it, am all, am only it. / When thought returns it feels foreign, Terrified by this infinity and in awe, / I cannot grasp the gazing's depth.

According to Mayos¹¹⁹, Hegel, driven by Hölderlin's enthusiasm wrote something beyond his own convictions, namely that thought - reason -, is afraid of the infinite and cannot grasp it in its full depth, while the fantasy copes with the eternal (that is the infinite, the absolute) and makes it real, even shapes it for the senses. Indeed, the young Hegel stops and rectifies in front of the expression of the failure of reason and thought and the success of fantasy.

In the end, the absolute or the infinite has never been a sole question of thought or reason for Hölderlin, as in the case of Hegel. For Hölderlin it is fully acceptable to admit that reason or thought are afraid and flee from the absolute infinite, while Hegel would never accept this view and in contrast to his friend he becomes aware of the peculiarity of his own thought.

Hölderlin splits up the absolute and infinite from the reason or thought. Even more, at a later stage Hölderlin reaches the conclusion that not only that the reason flees from the absolute, trusting that they may be other ways to reach the absolute. But, that the absolute flees from the reason, especially from the reason of state, the astute reason of Hermocrates and Creon reflected in Sophocles' play *Antigone*.

In a sense Hölderlin represents the apogee of Romanticism. Weilnböck¹²⁰ has called the attention to some mysterious paragraphs of the *Empedokles* where the ambiguity of the references to "free people" - should they identified with the "most limited mortals" and/or with the "geniuses" - is present. The ambiguity extends to Empedokles himself, who, totally occupied with the narcissistic predicament of not knowing what is self and other, and being is entirely incapable of having any realistic notion of existing power, poverty, and enslavement being not able to provide help or assistance of any sort. From this standpoint,

Weilnböck makes a political reading from the perspective of a Romantic Revolution where the Sicilians of Agrigento are "free" and these other "peoples" are perceived as less free and, therefore, as "most limited mortals" who are deserving of the Sicilians help. The conclusion leads to the "the dark side of modernity", the twentieth century totalitarisms:

"At the heart of Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin lies the fascination with the artistic expression of a narcissistic cultural milieu, which with Heidegger at least to a certain degree seems to have entailed a fascination for what Susan Sontag called fascinating fascism and which I would call narcissistic Nazism. Germania's or Empedokles's violently enlightened and narcissistic hysteria of knowing it all better and cracking down on everyone who does not want to know sounds so familiar."¹²⁰

A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

We would like to conclude that with the available data the recency hypothesis of schizophrenia can be accepted with some changes. The first one is not limit the causes to biological factors as Torrey¹²¹, Torrey et al.¹²² and Hare¹²³ did when formulating the theory. Of course, the incidence of genetic, obstetric, brain damage, transmissible and other organic vulnerability causes has accumulated sufficient evidence as not to be disregarded. In addition, stresses such as migration and urbanization and social conditions such as those present in industrialized and developed countries are commonly accepted as triggering factors or as negative circumstances for the outcome of schizophrenia.

Our intimacy hypothesis aims to add a new perspective, an internalizing one, to explain how the currently accepted vulnerability and triggering factors operate in individual patients in Romantic and post-Romantic eras. Our hypothesis also aims to explain why the disease did not exist or better, why it did not manifest itself in the way it has been doing in the last two centuries. The cue is the appearance of a new anthropological dimension, the discovery of intimacy and the developments in selfhood and ipseity, the qualities that constitutes the individuality of a person and which until the end of the eighteenth century was repressed in human beings.

The intimacy hypothesis makes unnecessary some of the speculations of the recency hypothesis. For instance, the hypothesis of a mutation of a gene leading to the outbreak of schizophrenia circa 1760 is difficult to accept, if only because the appearance occurred almost simultaneously in different places: the Bethlem Hospital in London, La Salpêtrière Hospital in Paris and in different places in Germany. However, it is certainly impossible to ignore the

fact that there is a strong genetic load in schizophrenia. Globally the heredability of schizophrenia is high, 80%¹²⁴, although most of recent research focuses not so much on the disease itself, as on the cognitive or morphological endophenotypes associated to the disease, which are also frequently present in relatives of patients. The figures seem to suggest that environmental, social and cultural, factors may play an important role in the development of the disease¹²⁵⁻¹²⁸. Nevertheless stochastic or epigenetic factors may play the role up to now attributed to the environment. Although a hypothesis combining genetic diathesis with environmental stress cannot be disproved, it is also possible that non-genetic factors consisting entirely of stochastic events affecting gene expression or structure¹²⁸. If the latter was the case then the recency hypothesis should be reconsidered from scratch.

We have considered Hölderlin as the *princeps* case of our hypothesis. However it may be possible that the origin of his most probable schizophrenia is etiologically unrelated to Romanticism and more precisely to German Idealism. It is not true that the other visionaries of this intellectual movement such as Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, never showed symptoms of psychosis? Did Hölderlin cross a line that the rest did not dare to approach, as the poem of Hegel suggests? Does all this have to do with what we see in our patients in everyday practice? Did Hölderlin fought with monsters or gaze for too long in the abyss avoiding Nietzsche's proverb: *He who fights with monsters should be careful lest he thereby become a monster. And if thou gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will also gaze into thee*¹²⁹.

Recently, a patient very fond of music wrote us a letter with long comments on Alban Berg's opera *Wozzeck*. One of the paragraphs reads as follows:

The antiromantic themes of vanguard artistic manifestations have in addition something that concerns my own psychological life. The reason is that occasionally I use atonal vanguard music to cool and to contain the emotional enthusiasm - which I believe deeply unhealthy - that produces in me hearing romantic music, specially the one of Wagner. Metaphorically speaking we could say that atonal music helps me to eliminate romantic toxins.

Of course we don't mean the confrontation with the numinous straightforwardly precipitated Hölderlin into madness and more specifically into schizophrenia. Nevertheless if we take into account the psychoses precipitated by exceptional states of consciousness¹³⁰, such as deep meditation and the fact that acute psychoses are a risk factor for future development of schizophrenia, the possibility of such triggering cannot be dismissed.

Genes and culture

There is a growing evidence, and not only in the realm of mental disorders, that there is a strong overlapping of genes involved in the pathophysiology of certain diseases and the activity of external agent like viruses. Some genes implicated in schizophrenia, including those also concerned for neurophysiology, are intimately related to the lifecycles of the pathogens implicated in the disease of schizophrenia such as the influenza virus, herpes simplex, cytomegalovirus (CMV), rubella, or *Toxoplasma gondii* bind. Several genes may affect pathogen virulence, while the pathogens in turn may affect genes and processes relevant to the neurophysiology of schizophrenia. For such genes, the strength of association in genetic studies is likely to be conditioned by the presence of the pathogenic agent, which varies in different populations at different times, a factor that may explain the heterogeneity that plagues such studies¹³¹.

New perspectives in the field of Network Medicine¹³²⁻¹³⁴ may help to clarify some of the current controversies. With the complete sequence of the human genome a reality, and with a growing body of transcriptomic, proteomic, and metabolomic databases available for research in health and disease, medicine has the capacity to define human disease precisely, uniquely, and unequivocally, with optimal sensitivity and specificity¹³⁵. *The network concept reveals a number of surprising connections between diseases, forcing us to rethink the way in which we classify and separate them.*¹³²

Disease is rarely a consequence of an abnormality in a single gene, but reflects the perturbations of the complex intracellular network. Given the functional interdependencies between the molecular components in a human cell, the emerging tools of network medicine offer a platform to explore systematically the molecular relationships between apparently distinct (patho) phenotypes¹³⁶. Most cellular components exert their functions through interactions with other cellular components, the totality of these interactions representing the *human interactome*. Phenotypic networks (co-expression networks, in which genes with similar co-expression patterns are linked) and genetic are also present. The hypothesis is that once a few disease components are recognised, the other disease-related components will likely be in their network-based vicinity. That is, we expect that each disease can be linked to a well-defined neighbourhood of the *interactome*, often referred to as a *disease module*.

The highly interconnected nature of the *interactome* means that at the molecular level, it is difficult, to consider diseases as being invariably independent of one another. Indeed, different disease modules can overlap, so that alterations caused by one disease can affect other disease modules. The systematic mapping of such network-based

dependencies between the pathophenotypes and their disease modules has culminated in the concept of the *diseasome*¹³⁷, representing disease maps whose nodes are diseases and whose links represent various molecular relationships between the disease-associated cellular components.

The Psychiatric Genomics Consortium¹³⁸ has published genetic data showing underlying genetic effects shared between five disorders: autism spectrum disorder, attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder, bipolar disorder, major depressive disorder, and schizophrenia. The Consortium analysed genome-wide single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) data for the five disorders in 33,332 cases and 27,888 controls of European ancestry. Polygenic risk scores showed cross-disorder associations, notably between adult-onset disorders. Their findings show that specific SNPs are associated with a range of psychiatric disorders of childhood onset or adult onset, providing evidence relevant to the goal of moving beyond descriptive syndromes in psychiatry, and towards a nosology informed by disease etiopathogenesis.

SI NON È VERO, È BEN TROVATO: A PSYCHOTHERAPEUTICAL APPROACH TO THE LABYRINTH

While reviewing the evidence and writing these two papers we have reached a better understanding schizophrenia and of the people who suffer from it. We also feel more solidary with them. Every big revolution sacrifices some people who cannot adapt to the new times and in doing so they fall into illness. The fate of people with schizophrenia is less dramatic in developing countries as WHO studies have shown. We would be inclined to support the notion that the fate of people carrying the genetic load to suffer from the disease was protected from it in pre-Romantic eras. From this point in time, we can envisage two areas of progress. The first is to incorporate to current treatment strategies – antipsychotic medications, psychosocial rehabilitation, psychoeducation and re-socialization procedures – and extra one, a cultural one. We are considering discussions on the characteristic and structure of Modern – and post-Modern – societies, their advantages, challenges and dangers, the right to be different without been considered an outcast.

The second area of action is to delve in the mechanisms that protect the non-schizophrenic population in order to better help our patients and better understand the society in which we live. We should add that the disturbed sense of self-portrayed that is one result of the disease of schizophrenia, has been the object of psychosocial approaches in therapy^{139,140}, carried out in tandem with the personal struggle of the patient in order to achieve recovery¹⁴¹. What we are appealing for here is a psychotherapy

which would embrace self-experience¹⁴² and cultural experience from a phenomenological perspective. The intimacy hypothesis as considered by ourselves and the WHO studies on the putative protective factors in pre-industrial and developing societies open the doors for different approaches and for new hopes.

The Junguian analyst Astrachan has proposed the outline for deep psychotherapy in times of disappearance, loss and the absence of the gods¹⁴³, which addresses the comments of Dörr cited above on the loss of God in post-Modern societies⁵⁷. In other words, a technique adapted for the historic and cultural setting of analysis and therapist in late Modern and post-Modern times. Astrachan bases his proposal in the study of the poetry of Hölderlin (and to a lesser extent of Rilke) in which he tries to establish the significance of fragmentation and conflagration in the post-industrial landscape that we inhabit manifestation, for the manifestations of the psyche.

"What does the 'death of god' means for our notions of symbol and self and for the practice of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis? How do we understand our daily clinical work in the context of ruin, holocaust and despair?"

Astrachan's proposal is based on a series of Hölderlin verses on the romantic endeavor to recuperate the ancient gods and on the figure of Empedokles, king, philosopher, physician and god and on top of it, on the concomitantly present and absent death of god.

Furchtlos bleibt aber, so er es muss, der Mann / Einsam vor Gott, es schützt die Einfalt ihn, / Und keiner Waffen brauchts und keine / Listen, so lange, bis Gottes Fehl hilft.

But fearless man remains, as he must, / Alone before God, simplicity protects him, / And he needs neither weapons / Nor cunning until God's being not there helps him.

Astrachan quotes Fritz Lang in Jean Luc Godard's film *Le Mépris* (1964)¹⁴⁴ where the German director comments on the obscurity of the last verse of the poem which apparently had two earlier versions:

"so lange der Gott nicht da ist" ('as long as God is not there') and "so lange der Gott uns nahe ist" ('as long as God is near us'). The final version stresses in a most forceful and anxiety overloaded way, the ambiguity of man's experience of god. In the film Lang concludes the scene by saying that "what Hölderlin writes is very strange, but true".

The drama of late modern (and post-modern) human being is in Astrachan's words: *To what dark God must we*

pay our respects in order to go down and emerge from the labyrinth of our own smoky-chambered souls, thick with thoughts and ideas? Nietzsche writes of one god, Dionysus, who tells Ariadne: "I am thy labyrinth"⁴⁵.

Dörr has published an in-depth study¹⁴⁶ of what is the labyrinth in two of its aspects, the labyrinth as lived space¹⁴⁷, as possible human space as, and the labyrinth as a myth and put them in relation to the fundamental alteration of schizophrenia.

The labyrinth is, by definition, a space that has an easy access, but that is impossible to get out of it. It is a space that leads to nowhere. Only an exceptional, heroic and worthy to be sung, action allows solving the enigma of a space that is not governed by the laws of conventional space. It is a space where conventional orientation is impossible and where the only thing that can be found in it is a monster that lives hidden in it, ready to kill the offender who has ventured to cross the threshold of the labyrinth.

According to Dörr, the labyrinth is the only space that is locked within itself and has no reference to another space. The only external reference is cut; a door that allows entry but not exit, a door that is opened only every nine years in the case of Crete. A labyrinth is a world closed in on itself, not even the Minotaur was allowed the luxury of taking a walk by the beautiful mediterranean island. In the labyrinth each of his ways returns to the starting point. The labyrinth is a metaphor of the place of no return, the Hades, the hell, but also of schizophrenia. A hell inhabited by monsters, hybrid beings in the purest sense of the classic word hybrid, at the same time human beings, animals and gods, able to maintain an order that the daring defiler of the labyrinthine space, destroys forever with his heroic act. But the Minotaur also represents the human condition since the human being is *ni ange ni bête*⁴⁸, nor angel nor animal.

According to Dörr, the nexus between the labyrinthine space and schizophrenia is Mannerism, the current of pictorial art that emerges as a need to overcome that harmony which is so characteristic of the classicism and consists on a voluntary and forced pursuit of originality in the disharmonic, in ambiguous, ultimately, in the absurd. The most recurring themes of Mannerism are the labyrinth, the mirror, the mask, the artifice, the monstrous and the unusual associations. Now, all of these features bring Mannerism close to the world of schizophrenia. It is worth remembering that from the first descriptions of the disease made by Kraepelin⁶² and Bleuler⁶³ are references to movements, gestures, behaviors, expressions and thoughts "stereotyped" and "mannered" and years later Ludwig Binswanger¹⁴⁹ came to argue that the mannerisms were not only a symptom, but an essential feature of schizophrenic mode of being.

In fact, Dörr suggests that every of the core symptoms of schizophrenia could be understood as the expression of an extreme Mannerism and with a peculiar link with one of his favorite themes: the labyrinth. As a consequence it is present in the loosening of associations, the disorganized thinking, in the use of verbigeration, in stereotypic movements and mannerisms, both in content and in form of the language.

The Mannerist art uses very often themes such as the mirror and nothing could more reflect that duplication of feelings and wills, characteristic of the ambivalence of schizophrenia, that the Mannerist mirror. You are and you are not at the same time. One is his own image (in the mirror) and the image is at the same time oneself. The labyrinth is the autistic space par excellence. There is no reference to the other, but only to oneself. In this space the individual with schizophrenia moves with the ambivalence of the junctions, without ever finding neither the course nor the exit and, having to face, sometimes directly, i.e., with very few defense mechanisms, those fears that emerge from the depth which we call the psychotic anguish.

Goethe says that the twisted, the capricious and arbitrary, that what pretends to be or is too different, rarely penetrates into the essence of things and remains on the surface. The tragic condition of the existence of the patient with schizophrenia is that he or she, in its desperate search for itself, finds just emptiness, since the self is never on oneself, but on the other.

The difficulty that people suffering from schizophrenia have to accept the dialectical condition of existence is manifested in his artistic production through countless unnecessary details, which are mere graphic pyrotechnics, pure artifice. Summing up, empty and abandoned labyrinths, no threatening Minotaurs nor saviors like Theseus, who, with the help of love, would allow access to a true meaning to all those prisoners in the labyrinth, may be even to ourselves..

REFERENCES

1. López-Ibor JJ, López-Ibor MI. Romanticismo y esquizofrenia. Primera parte: la hipótesis de la recencia. *Actas Esp de Psiquiat.* 2014;42(4):133-58; Romanticism and schizophrenia. First part: the recency hypothesis. *Actas Esp de Psiquiat.* 2014;42(4):133-58.
2. Greenfeld L. *Mind, modernity, madness: The impact of culture on human experience.* Harvard, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013.
3. Greenfeld L. *Nationalism: Five roads to modernity.* Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992.
4. Greenfeld L. *Nationalism and the mind: Essays on modern culture.* Oxford: Oneworld, 2006.
5. Durkheim E. *De la division du travail social.* Paris: Les Presses universitaires de France, 1967.
6. Plotino. (1998). *Enéadas: libros V y VI.* Madrid: Editorial

- Gredos. Plotinus. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
7. Voigt G. Die Wiederbelebung des classischen Alterthums oder das erste Jahrhundert des Humanismus. 2 Bde.3th. Berlin: G Reimer, 1893.
 8. Brown SL. The politics of individualism: Liberalism, liberal feminism, and anarchism. Sydney: Black Rose Books Ltd, 1993.
 9. Meikins Wood E. Mind and politics: An Approach to the meaning of liberal and socialist individualism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972; pp 6-7.
 10. Foucault M. Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique. Paris: Gallimard, 1972; Foucault M. Historia de la locura en la época clásica. 2 ed México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1976; Foucault M. History of madness. New York: Routledge, 2009.
 11. Descartes R. Discours de la méthode. Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1996. Descartes R. Discurso del método. Madrid: Alhambra, 1987. Descartes R. Discourse on method, optics, geometry, and meteorology. Indianapolis: Hacket Publishing, 1998.
 12. López-Ibor JJ, Ortiz T, López-Ibor MI. Perception, experience and body identity. Actas Esp Psiquiatr. 2011 Dec;39(Suppl 3):3-118.
 13. Descartes R. Meditationes de prima philosophia. Paris: Michel Soly, 1641. Descartes R. Los principios de la filosofía. Madrid: Alianza, 1995. Descartes R. The philosophical writings of Descartes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
 14. Heidegger M. Die Frage nach der Technik. <http://ebookbrowse.net/martin-heidegger-die-frage-nach-der-technik-pdf-d379249685>; La pregunta por la técnica. En: Conferencias y artículos, Ediciones del Serbal, Barcelona, 1994, pp. 9-37; the question concerning technology. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993.
 15. Merleau-Ponty M. Phénoménologie de la perception. Paris: Gallimard, 1945. Merleau-Ponty M. Fenomenología de la percepción. Barcelona: Editorial Altaya, 1999. Merleau-Ponty M. Phenomenology of perception. London: Routledge, 1962. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/>
 17. Herder JG. Philosophical writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2007.
 18. Berlin I. Three turning-points in political thought: 3 romanticism. The Isaiah Berlin Literary Trust 2005. <http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk/lists/nachlass/romanticism.pdf>
 19. www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/romanticism
 20. Drabble M. The oxford companion to english literature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985.
 21. Sebold RP. La cosmovisión romántica: Siete sintomas y cinco metáforas. Castilla. Estudios de Literatura. 2011;2:311-23
 22. Garrett A. <http://www.csjb.pt/Alunos/CsjbNet/Documents/Ensin%20Secund%20C3%A1rio/Textos%20de%20apoio%20C2%BA%20ano/TA%20Mem%20C3%B3ria%20ao%20Conservat%20C3%B3ria%20Real%20A.%20Garrett.pdf>
 23. Turner TH. Interpretation of historical evidence. Br J Psychiatry. 1990 Feb;156:280.
 24. Fichte JG. Foundations of natural right. Trans. Michael Baur. Ed. Frederick Neuhouser. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
 25. García y Tassara G. Poesías. Colección formada por el autor. Madrid: Rivadeneyra, 1873.
 26. Millen J. Romantic creativity and the ideal of originality: A contextual analysis, in Cross-sections. The Bruce Hall Academic Journal. 2010;VI:91-104.
 27. Gómez de Avellaneda G. Obras. Madrid: Atlas, 1974.
 28. Novotny F. Painting and sculpture in Europe: 1780-1880. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988.
 29. Schiller F. Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen. Leipzig: Philipp ReclamVerlag, 2000.
 30. Schiller F. On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a series of Letters. Willoughby Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.
 31. Pascal B. Pensamientos. Madrid, Espasa Calpe, 1940. Pensées. E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc New York, 1958. <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18269/18269-h/18269->
 32. Todd J. Sensibility. London: Methuen, 1986.
 33. Becquer GA. Rimas y leyendas. Barcelona: Planeta, 1982.
 34. Pac A. (2005) Voltaire: El poema sobre el desastre de Lisboa o examen del axioma "Todo está bien" En: Revista de Filosofía y Teoría Política, Anexo 2005. Disponible en: http://www.fuente memoria.fahce.unlp.edu.ar/trab_eventos/ev.114/ev.114.pdf; Voltaire. Poem on the Lisbon disaster or an examination of the axiom, "All is Well". In: Toleration and other essays by Voltaire. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1912.
 35. Schelling FWJ. Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur als Einleitung in das Studium dieser Wissenschaft, 1797. Schelling FWJ. Ideas for a philosophy of nature: as introduction to the study of this science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
 36. Meléndez Valdés, Juan. Obras completas, ed. de Antonio Astorgano Abajo, Bibliotheca Aurea, Madrid, Cátedra, 2004.
 37. Musset A. Premières poésies. Poésies nouvelles. Paris: Éditions Gallimard et Librairie Générale Française, 1966.
 38. Diderot D. Œuvres philosophiques. Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 2010.
 39. López Ibor JJ. Experiencias psiquiátricas de la guerra española. Cirugía de Guerra. Rev Esp de Medicina. 1938;2(5).
 40. López Ibor JJ. Neurosis de Guerra. Madrid: Editorial Científico Médica, 1942.
 41. Barnes R. The 20th-Century art book. London: Phaidon Press, 2001.
 42. Breton A. Los pasos perdidos. Madrid: Alianza editorial, 1987.
 43. Breton A. Primer manifiesto surrealista. <http://www.isabelmonzon.com.ar/breton.htm>; http://self.gutenberg.org/eBooks/WPLBN0002171411-First_Manifesto_of_Surrealism_1924-by_Breton_Andr_.aspx
 44. De los Ríos Möller C. Psiquiatría & Surrealismo. 4ª edición. Viña del Mar (Chile): Ediciones Altazor, 2012.
 45. Budd D. The Language of Art: Knowledge cards. Portland Oregon: Pomegranate Communications, 2005. <http://pers-www.wlv.ac.uk/~fa1871/surrext.html>
 46. Locher D. Unacknowledged roots and blatant imitation: Postmodernism and the Dada movement. Electronic Journal of Sociology.1999;4(1).
 47. Dalí S. Diario de un genio. Tusquets, Barcelona, 1983. Diary of a genius. Creation books, 1998.
 48. Breton A. Manifiesto de surrealism.1918. <http://www.tcf.ua.edu/Classes/Jbutler/T340/SurManifiesto/ManifiestoOfSurrealism.htm>
 49. Breton A. y Freud S. Tres cartas de Sigmund Freud y la réplica de Breton. En: Los vasos comunicantes. Madrid: Siruela, 2005.
 50. Janet P. L'automatisme psychologique: Essai de psychologie expérimentale sur les formes inférieures de l'activité humaine. Paris: Alcan, 1889.
 51. James W. Notes on automatic writing. Proceedings of the American Society for Psychical Research. 1889;1. pp. 548-64.
 52. De Clérambault GG. Oeuvre Psychiatrique. Paris: PUF, 1942.
 53. De Clérambault GG. Automatismo mental. Paranoia. Buenos Aires: Polemos Editorial, 1995.
 54. Lacan J. De la psicosis paranoica en sus relaciones con la personalidad. México: Siglo XXI Editores, 1932.
 55. Lacan J. El Seminario, libro 3, Las Psicosis. Buenos Aires: Paidós, 1993.

56. Chenieux-Gendron J. Surrealism. New York: Columbia Univ Pr, 1990.
57. Dörr Zegers O. La post modernidad y la pregunta por el sentido. *Acta Med. CSM.* 2010;4(1):59-64.
58. Baudrillard J. *Cultura y simulacro.* Barcelona: Editorial Kairós, 2005.
59. Heidegger M. *Das Wesen der Sprache.* In: *Unterwegs zur Sprache.* Pfullingen: Neske Verlag, 1959.
60. Sass LA. *Madness and modernism: Insanity in the light of modern Art, literature and thought.* New York: Basic Books, 1993.
61. Sass LA. *The paradoxes of delusion: Wittgenstein, Schreber, and the schizophrenic mind.* Ithaca, NY; Cornell University Press, 1995.
62. Kraepelin E. *Psychiatrie. Ein Lehrbuch für Ärzte und Studierende.* 6th ed. Leipzig: Barth, 1899.
63. Bleuler E. *Dementia Praecox oder Gruppe der Schizophrenien.* In: *Äschaffenburg G, Zinkin J. Handbuch der Psychiatrie. Spezieller Teil, 4 Abteilung, 1 Hälfte.* Leipzig und Wien: Franz Deuticke, 1911. Bleuler E. *Dementia praecox or the group of schizophrenias.* In: *Aschaffenburg G, Zinkin J. Ed. Handbuch der Psychiatrie* New York, NY: International University Press, 1950; pp 63-8.
64. López-Ibor Jr. JJ. El problema de la verdad en Psiquiatría. *Anales de la Real Academia Nacional de Medicina. Instituto de España, Año 2000-Tomo CXVII, Cuaderno Tercero,* pp 673-86.
65. Heidegger M. *El ser y el tiempo.* Madrid: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1989.
66. Blankenburg W. *Zur Differentialphänomenologie der Wahnwahrnehmungen. Eine Studie über abnormes Bedeutungserleben.* *Der Nervenarzt.* 1965;36:285-98.
67. Hillman J. *On paranoia.* En: *Eranos Yearbook 1985, Vol. 54. The Hidden Course of Events. Lectures given at the Eranos Conference in Ascona, August 21-29, 1985.* Frankfurt: Insel Verlag, 1987; pp 269-324.
68. Ey H. *Hallucinations et Délire,* Alcan 1934. réédité: Ed.: L'Harmattan, 2000.
69. Wittgenstein L. *Philosophical investigations.* Oxford: Blackwell, 1953.
70. Heller E. *Nirgends wird Welt sein als innen: Versuche über Rilke.* Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1975.
71. Ellenberger HF. *El descubrimiento del inconsciente. Historia y evolución de la psiquiatría dinámica.* Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1976. *The Discovery of the unconscious: The history and evolution of dynamic psychiatry.* New York: Basic Books, 1970.
72. López Ibor JJ. *El descubrimiento de la intimidad y otros ensayos.* Madrid: Aguilar, 1952.
73. Aristóteles. *Ética nicomaquea.* Gredos. Madrid, 1985. *Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics.* <http://classics.miet.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.html>
74. San Agustín. *Confesiones.* Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 2010. *St. Augustine. The Confessions of St. Augustine.* New York: Image Books, 1960.
75. Balzac. *La Comédie humaine.* Pierre Citron, ed. Preface by Pierre-Georges Castex. Paris: Seuil, 1965. *La comedia humana.* Barcelona: Editorial Lorenzana, 1966. *The human comedy: Selected Stories (New York Review Books Classics).*
76. Dieguez S. *Balzac's Louis Lambert: schizophrenia before Kraepelin and Bleuler.* *Front Neurol Neurosci.* 2013;31:10-34.
77. Freud S. *Das Ich und das Es. Metapsychologische Schriften.* Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1994. *Freud S. The ego and the id.* In: *Strachey J. The essentials of psychoanalysis.* London: Penguin, 1986. *Freud S. El yo y el ello.* Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2002.
78. Rousseau JJ. *Les confessions.* http://www.ebooks-bnr.com/wp-content/uploads/rousseau_les_confessions.pdf; *The confessions.* <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3913/3913.txt>; Madrid: Alianza, 2008.
79. Rousseau J-J. *Rousseau, juge de Jean-Jacques. Dialogues. In Oeuvres complètes, 4 vols.* Paris, 1959. <http://www.histoire.ens.fr/IMG/pdf/Lilti-Representations.pdf>
80. Lilti A. *The writing of paranoia: Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the paradoxes of celebrity.*
81. Goethe JW von. *Die Leiden des jungen Werthers in Goethes Werke. Hamburger Ausgabe in 14 Bänden, Band 6, Hamburg 1948 ff: Zeno.org Online (Original-Einleitung von 1774) (2005). Las penas del joven Werther. Traducción Osvaldo y Esteban Bayer. Introducción Jorge Warley. Buenos Aires: Colihue; The sorrows of young Werther.* <http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/2527>
82. Rousseau JJ. *Rêveries du promeneur solitaire, Paris: Éditions Livre de Poche, «Les Classiques de poche» (1782), 2001.*
83. Chateaubriand FR. *Atala, René, Les aventures du dernier Abencérage.* Paris: Flammarion, 1996.
84. Castilla del Pino C. *Cordura y locura en Cervantes.* Barcelona: Península, 2005.
85. Dostoievski F. *Escritos sobre el Quijote.* En: *El Quijote desde Rusia.* Madrid: Visor Libros, 2005.
86. Arechederra JJ, Choza J. *Locura y realidad. Lectura psicoantropológica del Quijote.* Sevilla: Editorial Thémata, 2010.
87. Fuentes C. *Discurso en la Ceremonia de Entrega del premio Cervantes.* <http://biblio.uah.es/BUAH/Webcat/Cervantes/87CarlosFuentes.pdf>
88. Ramón y Cajal S. *Psicología de don Quijote y el quijotismo. Discurso leído en la sesión conmemorativa de la publicación del «Quijote» celebrada por el Colegio Médico de San Carlos el día 9 de Mayo.* Madrid: Imprenta y librería de Nicolás Moya, 1905.
89. López Ibor JJ. *Opening speech. Proceedings of the fourth World Congress of Psychiatry: Madrid, 5-11 September 1966.* Amsterdam: Excerpta Medica Foundation, 1968.
90. Sass L, Parnas J. *Explaining schizophrenia: the relevance of phenomenology.* In: *Chung MC, Fulford KMW, Graham G, eds. Reconceiving schizophrenia.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007; pp 63-95.
91. Ortega y Gasset J. *Meditaciones del Quijote. Publicaciones de la Residencia de Estudiantes. 1914;II(1).*
92. Schütz A. *Don Quixote and the problem of reality.* In: *Collected Papers II. The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1976; pp 135-58, p 143.*
93. Lange-Eichbaum W. *Hölderlin; eine Pathographie.* Stuttgart: Enke, 1909.
94. Bertaux P. *Friedrich Hölderlin.* Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1978.
95. Bertaux P. *Der Wandel der Auffasungen über Hölderlins Krankheit. War Hölderlin Geisteskrank? Med Welt.* 1980;31(13):486-90.
96. Jaspers K. *Strindberg und van Gogh. Versuch einer pathographischen Analyse unter vergleichender Heranziehung von Swedenborg und Hölderlin.* Bern: Piper, 1922.
97. Kretschmer E. *Geniale Menschen.* Berlin: Julius Springer, 1929.
98. Peters UH. *Hölderlin: Dichter, Kranker - Simulant. Nervenarzt.* 1981 May;52(5):261-8.
99. Waiblinger W. *Hölderlins Leben, Dichtung und Wahnsinn. 1830.* <http://www.wbenjamin.org/holderlin.html>
100. Stierlin H. *Hölderlins dichterisches Schaffen im Lichte seiner schizophrenen Psychose. Psyche (Stuttg).* 1972 Jul-

- Aug;26(7):530-48.
101. Laplanche J. Hölderlin et la question du père. Paris: PUF, 1961. Hölderlin and the question of the father. Victoria: ELS Editions, 2007.
 102. Frommer J. Exzentrische Bahn und schizophrene Ichspaltung. Friedrich Hölderlins philosophische Fragmente in ihrer Beziehung zu Leben und Krankheit. *Fortschr Neurol Psychiatr.* 1995 Sep;63(9):341-9.
 103. Hölderlin F. Zu Jakobis Briefen über die Lehre des Spinoza. In: Hölderlin F. *Sämtliche Werke* 2. Band. Wiesbaden: Emil Volmer Verlag, 1790; pp 346-9.
 104. Supprian U. Schizophrenie und Sprache bei Hölderlin. Eine psycholinguistische Untersuchung zum Problem der präschizophrenen Psychopathie. *Fortschr Neurol Psychiatr Grenzgeb.* 1974 Dec;42(12):615-34.
 105. Weineck SK. Logos and Pallaksch. The loss of madness and the survival of poetry in Paul Celan's "Tübingen, Jänner". *Orbis Litterarum.* 1999;54(4):262-75
 106. López Ibor JJ. *Symposium sobre esquizofrenia.* Madrid: Ed. Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1957.
 107. Blankenburg W. *Der Verlust der natürlichen Selbstverständlichkeit. Ein Beitrag zur Psychopathologie symptomarmer Schizophrenien.* Stuttgart: Enke, 1971.
 108. Wyrsh J. *Über die Freiheit bei Störung von Gemüt und Geist.* Psychiatr Clin (Basel). 1979;12(3):117-39.
 109. Scharfetter C. *Schizophrene Menschen.* 5th Ed. Stuttgart: Beltz-PVU, 1999.
 110. Jakobson R, Lübke-Grothues G. Ein Blick auf die Aussicht von Hölderlin. In: *Selected writings. Vol. III Poetry of grammar and grammar of poetry.* Water De Gruyter Mouton. Amsterdam, 1981.
 111. Zimmermann V. Vom Olymp zur Hölle? Die Pathographie Friedrich Hölderlins. (1770-1843). *Fortschr Med.* 1987 Sep 20;105(27):80-1.
 112. Hölderlin F. *Sämtliche Werke und Briefe in drei Bänden.* Ed. Jochen Schmidt. 3 vols. Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1992-94.
 113. Jung CG. *The red book.* New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009.
 114. Henrich D. *Lebensdeutungen der Zukunft.* St. Gallen: Hochschule, 1981.
 115. Piulats O. Identidad y diferencia en la filosofía de la unificación de Hölderlin. *Identidad humana y fin de milenio. THEMATA.* 1999;23:477-86.
 116. Hölderlin, JCF. *Samtlicher Werke.* Stuttgarter Ausgabe. Band 6,1,181. <http://digital.wlb-stuttgart.de/digitale-sammlungen/seitenansicht/>
 117. Hölderlin F. *Hyperion and Selected Poems.* New York: Continuum, 1990.
 118. Anton H. Eleusis. Hegel an Hölderlin. *Hölderlin-Jahrbuch*1975/77;285-302.
 119. Mayos G. Hölderlin: nihilismo de la razón astuta. En: *Romanticismo y fin de siglo.* Oliver G, Siguán M. Barcelona: Càtedra Ramon Llull-Estudi General Lul.lià y Editorial PPU, 1992; pp 281-95.
 120. Weilnböck H. Romantic revolution and the psychoanalysis of totalitarianism: A postfreudian reading of Friedrich Hölderlin's *Der Tod des Empedokles.* (Unpublished manuscript). http://weilnboeck.entredoux.de/downloads/hw_2002d_en.pdf
 121. Torrey EF. *Schizophrenia and civilization.* New York and London: Jason Aronson Publishers, 1980.
 122. Torrey EF, Miller J. *The invisible plague. The rise of mental illness from 1750 to the present.* New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2001.
 123. Hare E. Schizophrenia as a recent disease. *The British Journal of Psychiatry.* 1988;153:521-31.
 124. van Dongen J, Boomsma DI. The evolutionary paradox and the missing heritability of schizophrenia. *Am J Med Genet B Neuropsychiatr Genet.* 2013 Mar;162B(2):122-36.
 125. Lichtenberg P, Marcus EL. Strength of the genetic effect in schizophrenia. *Br J Psychiatry.* 1994 Sep;165(3):408-9.
 126. Upton MW, Hoogkamer RA. Strength of the genetic effect in schizophrenia. *Br J Psychiatry.* 1994 Sep;165(3):409.
 127. Eagles JM. Strength of the genetic effect in schizophrenia. *Br J Psychiatry.* 1994 Aug;165(2):266.
 128. McGuffin P, Asherson P, Owen M, Farmer A. The strength of the genetic effect. Is there room for an environmental influence in the aetiology of schizophrenia? *Br J Psychiatry.* 1994 May;164(5):593-9.
 129. Nietzsche F. *Jenseits von Gut und Böse.* <http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/7204>. Más allá del bien y del mal. http://www.nietzscheana.com.ar/textos/de_mas_alla_del_bien_y_del_mal.htm; Beyond good and evil. Translator: Helen Zimmern <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4363/4363.txt>
 130. García-Albea J, González-Vives S, Tejeira C, Castro E, López-Ibor JJ, López-Ibor MI. Psychoses induced by exceptional states of consciousness. *Actas Esp Psiquiatr.* 2012;40(Suppl 2):80-95. Psicosis inducidas por estados excepcionales de conciencia. *Actas Esp Psiquiatr.* 2012;40(Supl 2):80-95.
 131. Carter CJ. Schizophrenia susceptibility genes directly implicated in the life cycles of pathogens: cytomegalovirus, influenza, herpes simplex, rubella, and *Toxoplasma gondii.* *Schizophr Bull.* 2009 Nov;35(6):1163-82.
 132. Barabási A-L. Network medicine - From obesity to the "diseasome". *NEJM.* 2007;357:404.
 133. Pawson T, Linding R. Network medicine. *FEBS Lett.* 2008;582:1266-70.
 134. Zanzoni A, Soler-López M, Aloy P. A network medicine approach to human disease. *FEBS Lett.* 2009;583:1759-65.
 135. Loscalzo J, Kohane I, Barabasi AL. Human disease classification in the postgenomic era: A complex systems approach to human pathobiology *Molecular Systems Biology.* 2007;3:124.
 136. Barabási A, Gulbahce N, Loscalzo J. Network medicine: A network-based approach to human disease. *Nat Rev Genet.* 2011 January;12(1):56-68
 137. Goh K-I, et al. The human disease network. *PNAS.*2007; 104:8685-90.
 138. Cross-Disorder group of the Psychiatric Genomics Consortium. Identification of risk loci with shared effects on five major psychiatric disorders: a genome-wide analysis. www.thelancet.com Published online February 28 2013.
 139. Davidson L. *Living outside mental illness: qualitative studies of recovery in schizophrenia.* New York: New York University Press, 2003.
 140. Estroff SE. Self, identity and subjective experiences of schizophrenia: in search of the subject. *Schizophr Bull.* 1989;15:189-96.
 141. Strauss JS. Subjective experiences of schizophrenia: toward a new dynamic psychiatry - II. *Schizophr Bull.* 1989;15:179-87.
 142. Kohut H. *The restoration of the self.* New York: International Universities Press, 1977.
 143. Astrachan GA. What is analysis? *Journal of Analytical Psychology.* 2000;45:449-58.
 144. Godard JL. *Contempt.* Culver City, California: Columbia Tri Star Home Video, 1964.
 145. Crawford C. *To Nietzsche: Dionysus, I love you! Ariadne.* Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995.
 146. Dörr Zegers O. *El laberinto: espacio, mito y locura.* Anales de

- la Academia Nacional de Ciencias de Buenos Aires. Tomo XLI (2)2007,75-71. <http://www.ciencias.org.ar/user/files/38%20D%C3%B6rr%20Zegers.pdf>
147. Straus E. Die Formen des Räumlichen. ihre Bedeutung für die Motorik und die Wahrnehmung. In: Psychologie der menschlichen Welt. Berlin- Göttingen-Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, 1960.
148. Maurois A. Ni ange ni bête. Fiction historique. Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1919.
149. Binswanger L. Drei Formen missglückten Daseins. Verstiegtheit, Verschobenheit, Manieriertheit. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1956.